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Article 5

NEBRASKA PROCEDURE IN
EMINENT DOMAIN
Harold S. Salter*
Before any highway program may leave the planning stage
and enter the construction phase, the State must first secure the
necessary right-of-way. It is here, in condemnation, that the attorney normally becomes first concerned with highway construction, for it is here that the landowner suddenly realizes his need
for counsel. In the following article, the author, Chief Counsel
of the Nebraska Department of Roads, outlines the Nebraska procedures in eminent domain, giving many authoritative citations
from both Nebraska statutes and case law. The attorney who
finds himself concerned in any way with condemnation procedure
in Nebraska will find the article to be excellent reading.
The Editors
I. INTRODUCTION.
Securing right-of-way for the construction of an Interstate
Highway across Nebraska raises no new problems that do not
presently exist in securing right-of-way for other State Highways.
But the problems are magnified on the "Interstate" route and
where only one or two special problems must normally be met
in securing right-of-way through a property, on the "Interstate"
there are usually four or five special problems on each property.
The "Interstate" differs from our other State highways in that
it is of much greater width; its maximum grade is 3% rather than
5%, resulting in deeper cuts and higher fills; there is absolutely
no direct access to the highway from adjoining properties; it is
all new right of way, as distinguished from merely widening an
existing right-of-way; and it will go through or near the State's
two largest cities and many of her other larger communities. This
last fact is exceedingly important. Past experience has shown
that securing right-of-way on the outskirts of even small communities raises difficulties that are not met in strictly rural areas
or indeed in the city itself, this fringe area not having definitely
establshed real estate values and not being subject to either a
*
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rural or a city valuation in the owners, the State representatives,
or an appraiser's opinion.
This multiplying of problems in the securing of right-of-way
"has resulted in a very high percentage of condemnations on the
"Interstate", and is focusing eminent domain and its procedure.
upon the consciousness of the lawyers in the areas through which
the "Interstate" passes. This rise in the percentage of condemnation proceedings results because of an increase in degree of each
of the elements that usually confront the securing of high-of-way
for highway purposes. There is usually more land taken for the
"Interstate" with greater damage to the remainder and the lack of
access is still unfamiliar and contrary to our previous thinking
and experience. The fact that it is all new location rather than
mere widening results in large segregated areas in the land not
being taken; going through the fringe area of a town or city results in honest differences of opinion of value, the differences
being as much as ten or fifteen to one. All of these factors help
overcome the landowners nature reluctance to allow his differences
with the right-of-way buyer to be settled by legal process. The
buyer has his difficulties in attempting to reconcile the need of
keeping the costs down against the desire of many landowners
to secure easy State and Federal money, and the needs of consistency against the needs of fairness.
In far away times the situation was resolved more simply,
the first highway right-of-way was met by a simple decree of King
Sennacherib. This ancient monarch of Assyria ruled that any
person whose property encroached upon the seventy-eight foot
width of the Royal Road should be put to death by impalation upon
a pole erected in front of his house. For the reader unacquainted
with either King Sennacherib1 or the Royal Road, it should be
explained that in the time of the King, 705 - 681 BC., this 1755
mile roadway extending from Susa above the Persian Gulf to the
west coast of Asia Minor, was the lifeline not of Assyria but of
most of the then known world as well.
The new Interstate System of Highways will have an impact
on our transportation system by building, for the first time since
the days of the Roman Empire, a system of roads equal to traffic
needs. Indeed, only in two periods of history have highways
failed to be the lifeline for all but a few small island nations.
Once, when by decadence nearly all travel and commerce was
so stilled that the period is remembered as the Dark Ages. The
1 The Holy Bible, 2 Kings 18:13.
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other, the short space of time a century ago when railroad traffic
gained ascendancy over the public road.
While the Interstate Highway System will be of major importance to this nation, through economic, military, pleasure, and
convenience factors, it raises numerous problems in procuring of
right-of-way, resulting in scores of condemnation proceedings.
Hence, at this time, a review of the law of Nebraska regarding
eminent domain procedure is most timely.
Of necessity, any discussion of eminent domain procedure in
Nebraska must begin with Article I, Section 21 of the Nebraska
Constitution, which states: "The property of no person shall be
taken or damaged for public use without just compensation therefor". This provision is not, and under no reasonable interpretation
may be considered, a grant of authority to the government. It is,
rather, a provision of limitation which does not deny the right of
the government to take or damage private property for a public
use, but requires that the government shall give "just compensation" when such acquisition or damage occurs. Except in cases of
special types of ownership, this provision and the "due process"
clause 2 are the only constitutional provisions with direct bearing
upon eminent domain procedure. The bulk of the procedure has
been established to fulfill the mandate of these two constitutional
provisions.
II.

PROCEDURES IN GENERAL

In 1951, the Nebraska Legislature enacted L.B. 146 which replaced varied condemnation methods for cities, counties, railroads,
and highways, etc. with a uniform condemnation procedure. The
first twenty-four sections of L.B. 146 are now sections 76-701 to
76-724 of the Revised Statutes of 1943. There remain certain exceptions to the uniform method, such as for condemnation of a
public utility giving existing service 3 and condemnation of public
school lands, 4 but the procedure for the public taking of an individual's land, or that of the usual private corporation, for highway
purposes is as set out in these twenty-four sections.
Before considering the statutory provisions, attention should
first be directed to the fact that the procedure outlined in the
statutes is primarily designed to afford a method of taking prop2
3

4

Neb. Const., Art. I, § 3.
Neb. Rev. Stat., § 76-703 (Reissue 1958).
Neb. Rev. Stat., §§ 72-224.01 to 72-224.04 (Reissue 1958).
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erty, as distinguished from damaging property. An early case
held that the statutory method for assessing damages for rightof-way did not apply where the property was damaged, but no
portion was taken. 5 Of course, this early decision was years before the present uniform act, but there is no reason to believe
that the uniform act changes the case rule, particularly in view
of the fact that section 76-705, which provides for "reverse" conin addition
demnation by the landowner, includes the words "...
to any other available remedy . . ."
Another question which will only be mentioned here is the
right or lack of right of the condemnee to question the right of
the condemner to take the property. While in some respects, this
might be considered as procedure, the subject, in the main, would
be best discussed under some other title. Nevertheless, one who
wishes to raise the question of the condemner's right to take
may find the time and procedure for having the point called to
the attention of the court somewhat vexatious. There are several
Nebraska cases that discuss this question in one or more of its
aspects, the most extensive 7being the May Case6 and the latest
being Twenty Club v. State.
III. CONDITIONS PRECEDENT
Before any proceedings in eminent domain may be had for
the purpose of taking any property, other than the property of
a public utility s or state school lands 9 which are specially treated
by the statutes, an offer and bona fide attempt to negotiate must
first be made. This requirement arises from statutory language.
In 1909, the words were "unable to agree"; 10 in 1913, they were
"when not agreed upon";" in 1951, the words became "shall fail
to agree".1 2 Our Supreme Court has held this language to mean
that an attempt to reach agreement between the parties is required.
G Burlington and M. R. Ry. Co. v. Reimhackle, 15 Neb. 279, 18 N. W. 69
(1883).
O May v. City of Kearney, 145 Neb. 475, 17 N.W.2d 448 (1945).
7 Twenty Club v. State, 167 Neb. 37, 91 N.W.2d 64 (1958).
s Neb. Rev. Stat., § 76-703 (Reissue 1958).

9 Neb.
10 Neb.
11 Neb.
12 Neb.

Rev. Stat., §§ 72-224.01 to 72-224.04 (Reissue 1958).
Comp. Stat., c. 89, Art. 4, § 12 (1909).
Rev. Stat., § 5945 (1913).
Rev. Stat., § 76-704 (Reissue 1958).
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In O'Neill v. Learner, 13 later affirmed by the United States
Supreme Court, 14 the Court touched upon this problem lightly.
While the Court did not hold directly that an attempt to reach
agreement between the parties was a condition precedent to the
institution of eminent domain proceedings, the Court noted that
there was no evidence that the plaintiffs had ever been willing
to grant a right-of-way upon any terms.
In Rogers v. Cosgrave, the Court examined the language of
the 1913 act more directly, stating:
If the exidence shows that there have been negotiations for
purchasing of the land between the parties which have failed because of certain disagreements, it shows sufficiently that the parties cannot agree.15
This case also furnishes authority for what appears to be a most
reasonable modification of the rule:
If one of two owners in common of the land fail to agree
to sell the same, it is unnecessary to negotiate with the other. It
will not be presumed that the company could make satisfactory
use of an undivided interest.
Such modification is extremely important if the condemning
authority is not to be so handicapped as to nullify the entire right
of eminent domain. For example, if the title to property is divided into 1/48 interests, with scattered and separated heirs, the
folly of having to contact 31 remaining heirs after being unable
to agree with the 17th is readily apparent. If this is the rule, then
certainly the Court should hold that there is no necessity to negotiate with owners who cannot, as well as will not, agree. Cases
of incompetency and lack of owner determination should fall into
such a class.
Dicta in the Rogers Case also indicates that it is not necessary
to show an attempt to purchase in cases where the landowner
denies the right of condemnation. While this is a logical conclusion, it is not, from the condemner's viewpoint, of near the
import as are the other exceptions previously discussed. In a
district court trial, however, where the principal 'desire of the
condemnee is to establish a high valuation upon the amount of
his damage, it is usual to waive and stipulate as to the fulfillment
of the requirement. Where the right to acquire is fought and
denied, there is seldom an agreement that the condemner com13

93 Neb. 786, 142 N.W. 112 (1913).

14

239 U.S. 244, 36 S.Ct. 54, 60 L.Ed. 249 (1915).

15 Rogers v. Cosgrave, 98 Neb. 608, 153 N.W. 569 (1915).
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plied with the requirement. For this reason, where the right to
acquire is attacked, a rule that such position makes it unnecessary
to prove an attempt to purchase would undoubtedly save considerable time and effort at the trial, and would not deprive the property owner of any present right.
The first case to lay down a guide as to the extent of the
negotiations that must be pursued by the condemner was the
Shirley Case, where the Court stated that:
...the condemnation proceedings are void in case no attempt
is made before beginning . . . to come to an agreement with the
owner . . . 'In order to satisfy the statutory requirement, there
must be a bona fide attempt to agree. There must be an offer
made honestly and in good faith, and a reasonable effort to induce the owner to accept it.' ")16
This language was affirmed in the Higgens Cases."1 In addition,
the Court stated that the attempt and failure to agree must be
alleged and proved, and that this must appear on the face of the
record.
Such language needs no interpretation. However, because
reliance is often made upon a misconception of part of the rule
laid down in these cases, a word of caution is necessary. Failure
to meet the statutory requirements voids the condemnation proceedings as a whole and not just on appeal. Therefore, where the
condemnee has secured a favorable award and the condemner has
appealed, the success of defeating the condemner's burden of
showing an offer and honest attempt to agree will also defeat
the condemnee's award and most likely subject him to a second
condemnation which may not be as favorable.
IV. ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS
A.

THE PETITION

The statutory authorization for the commencement of eminent
domain proceedings is stated simply:
If any condemnee shall fail to agree with the condemner with
respect to the acquisition of property sought by the condemner,
a petition to condemn the property may be filed by the condemner

in the county court of 8the county where the property or some
part thereof is situated.'

16 Shirley v. Harlan Co., 117 Neb. 846, 853, 223 N.W. 284 (1929), quoting
20 C. J. 892, 895, §§ 317, 318.
17 Higgens v. Loup River P.P.Dist., 157 Neb. 652, 61 N.W.2d 213 (1953);

Higgens v. Loup River P.P.Dist., 159 Neb. 549, 68 N.W.2d 170 (1955).
Is Neb. Rev. Stat., § 76-704 (Reissue 1958).
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With the exception of specifying where the petition is to be filed,
the nine words, "a petition to condemn the property may be
filed", constitute the only statutory 'direction as to the nature and
contents of the petition. Therefore, to ascertain the necessary
allegations of the petition, it is necessary to review the case law.
It has been held that a failure to set forth the jurisdictional
facts required by statute within the petition will void the proceedings,1 9 the one essential element, according to all opinions,
appears to be a description of the premises sufficient for the landowner to know exactly what lands are to be taken. On this point,
and the necessity of naming the parties, there is no varience in
the cases. Two cases have modified the severity of having to be
exact in every detail. The first allows the county judge to correct
2"
a mere clerical error in an order before the appraisal is made;
the second holds thtat even though the petition may be subject
to a'requirement to amend for lack of definiteness; it will not
subject the proceedings to2 1 be set aside if sufficient to give the
county judge jurisdiction..
One early decision states that the application to the county
judge for the appointment of appraisers need not be dated or
verified, but must be signed by some person empowered to do
so.2 2 A description of the land by government subdivision was
held to be insufficient where the real estate was within an incorporated city and had been laid out and platted into lots and
blocks.23 Some of the cases setting forth the requirements of
the petition and holding that land and works must be adequately
described are: Daily v. Missouri P. Ry. Co;2 4 Blue River Power Co.
v. Hronik;25 Consumers P. P. Dist. v. Eldred.2
The latter case
is also authority to the effect that the condemner must bring
in all known parties having an interest therein. A mortgagee is

19 Platte Valley P.P. & I. Dist. v. Feltz, 132 Neb. 227, 271 N.W. 787
(1937).
20

21
22
23
24
25

26

Johnson v. Platte Valley P.P. & I. Dist., 133
(1937).
Fremont E. & M.V.R. Co. v. Mattheis, 39 Neb.
Trester v. Missouri Pac.R. Co., 33 Neb. 171, 49
Omaha & R.V.R. Co. v. Rickards, 38 Neb. 847,
103 Neb. 219, 170 N.W. 888 (1919).
112 Neb. 500, 199 N.W. 788 (1924).
146 Neb. 926, 22 N.W.2d 188 (1946).

Neb. 97, 274 N.W. 386
98, 57 N.W. 987 (1894).
N.W. 1110 (1891).
57 N.W. 739 (1894).
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a necessary party
according to Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co.
27
v. Nordhues.
Pleading negligence in a damage action based upon the theory
of reverse condemnation is quite common, but is obviously not
proper since it has been held that allegations of negligence, unlawfulness, or wrongfullness of the work have no place in a petition for damages under Article I, Section 21 of the Nebraska Constitution. 28 It is also common to allege negligence of construction
in a petition or answer filed in a district court appeal, but it would
appear that such allegation should be subject to the same rule
as a similar allegation made in an original petition for damages.
B.

NOTICE

Two sections of the statutes set forth the notice to be given to
the landowner in a condemnation proceeding. 29 The notice to be
served upon the landowner is required by statute to show the
"intention to acquire the property, and of the time and place of
meeting of the board of appraisers to have the damages assessed."
Also, the statute provides for at least ten days from service until
the meeting of the board of appraisers. Service is made either
personally or by leaving a copy at the usual place of residence.
Non-residents may be served either by publication or by constructive service in the same manner as actions commenced in
the district court.
Naturally, the constitutional due process provisions also apply.
Indeed, the "due process" clause has been challenged at least
twice in Nebraska condemnation proceedings. In Albin v. Consolidated School District,30 a legislative act was attacked as a
violation of the "due process" clause 31 because it failed to provide
that the time and place of assessment had to be contained in the
notice to the landowner. The Supreme Court held this to be a
violation of the Constitution and declared the act void. The Court
also ruled that, even though the landowner had actual notice of
the time and place of assessment, this was not sufficient to act as
a substitute for the notice required by due process of law. Con-

27

129 Neb. 379, 261 N.W. 687 (1935).

Bonge v. Village of Winnetoon, 90 Neb. 260, 133 N.W. 203 (1911).
Neb. Rev. Stat., §§ 76-706, 76-722 (Reissue 1958).
30 106 Neb. 719, 184 N.W. 141 (1921).
31 Neb. Const., Art. I, § 3.
28

29
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versely, an earlier case3 2 is authority that service by publication,
while sufficient to give a county board jurisdiction in proceedings
for the opening of a road, will not deprive a landowner, who has
no actual notice until after the time for filing claims for damages
had expired, of his right to recover compensation. The court
said he had such right within a reasonable time after he had
received actual notice of the appropriation of his property. While
this case arose from the provisions for the opening of a road by
the county board rather than in the type of condemnation proceeding contemplated by the uniform act, it is difficult to see a
distinction. In line with the tendency of the courts to favor the
landowner under the theory that the right of eminent domain is
in derogation of the common right, this holding would undoubtedly be accepted today.
In Burgess-Nash Building Co. v. City of Omaha,3 3 the city
council acted under a statute which required that a determination be made as to whether the appraisal would exceed $100,000
in a condemnation proceeding for a public improvement. After
this determination, the statutory procedure then varied depending upon whether or not this figure was reached. The property
owner complained that such determination was a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution because he
had no opportunity to be heard when the determination was made.
Our Court held that this was not a violation of that Constitutional
provision since the property owner had an opportunity to be heard
at the time of the actual assessment of the amount of benefits
accruing to his property and had an opportunity to appeal to the
district court.
Two cases 34 define and hinge on the necessity of the notice
to state the time and place of hearing, but except for the lawyer
with a special situation in mind, it is sufficient for the purposes
of a general discussion to say that they merely help define the
requirements.
While it may be said that the Court has been strict regarding the giving of the time and place of assessment within the
notice, it may also be said that the Court has reached some rather
peculiar decisions. For example, though the Court refused to
32

Pawnee County v. Storm, 34 Neb. 735, 52 N.W. 696 (1892).

33

116 Neb. 862, 219 N.W. 394 (1928).
McGavock v. City of Omaha, 40 Neb. 64, 58 N.W. 543 (1894); Shannon
v. Bartholomew, 83 Neb. 821, 120 N.W. 460 (1909).

34
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allow the assessment of damages nine months after the time fixed
within the notice, 35 where the owner appeared before the board
and the board postponed the hearing giving assurance that the
owner would be given further opportunity to be heard, but made
their report without fulfilling their promise, the Court stated:
...

it is sufficient if the party has an opportunity to appear at

some time before a tribunal having jurisdiction, and there procure an adjustment of his rights or liabilities .. . The plaintiff
still had his right of appeal.3 6
The latter holding would seem out of line not only with the
strict rules of the other decisions on the subject, but also with
the spirit of those cases. If the right of appeal would be sufficient
to defeat the claim of denial of due process in one case, then
why in all other cases, where the owner has the right of appeal,
should defects, except lack of notice sufficient to deprive him of
that right, constitute a denial of his constitutional right.
In discussing other notice situations, our Court has held that
a "non-resident" means a non-resident of the state37 rather than
a non-resident of the county or of the land affected, 38 and that
constructive service by publication requiring four weeks notice
means continuous notice in the same paper and not part in one
and the remainder in another. 39 Failure to give notice of the
proceedings to all parties interested in the land has been held
to make the condemner take the land subject to such liens as are
40
prior to the rights of the parties to the proceedings.
C.

THE APPRAISAL PRocEss

In Mattheis v. Fremont E. & M. V. R. Co., the Nebraska Supreme Court said:
A condemnation proceeding is conducted by the County Judge,
the Sheriff, and the appraisers selected by the former. These
constitute a tribunal not to try a civil action pending between the
landowner and the railway company, to not pronounce a judg-

ment, but simply to assess the damages which the landowner will
sustain by reason of the appropriation of his land for the railroad's right of way. 41
Hull v. Chicago B. & Q. Ry. Co., 21 Neb. 371, 32 N.W. 162 (1887).
36 Burkley v. City of Omaha, 102 Neb. 308, 167 N.W. 72 (1918).
37 Sheridan County v. Hand, 114 Neb. 813, 210 N.W. 273 (1926).
38 Pacific R.R.Co. v. Perkins, 36 Neb. 456, 54 N.W. 845 (1893).
39 Hull v. C. B. & Q. Ry. Co., 21 Neb. 371, 32 N.W. 162 (1887).
40 State v. MVissouri Pac. Ry. Co., 75 Neb. 4, 105 N.W. 983 (1905).
41 Mattheis v. Fremont E. & M. V. R. Co., 53 Neb. 681, 684, 74 N.W. 30,
32 (1898).
3G
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This is as clear a statement of the general nature of the original
proceedings in condemnation as can be found anywhere. Today,
we would eliminate the term sheriff, since he is no longer concerned with choosing appraisers, and would also substitute "highway" for "railroad".
In several cases, the Nebraska Supreme Court has discussed
the question of whether or not this type of proceeding is ministerial or judicial in nature. In the Mattheis Case, supra, the
Court laid down the following rule:
The powers conferred upon the county judge and the duties
required of him in condemnation proceedings are not judicial
powers and duties but purely ministerial ones.
This statement was reaffirmed in Lane v. Burt County Rural
P. P. Dist.42 While this rule referred only to the powers of the
county judge, it was extended by the Court to ". . . the securing
of an appraisal of damages by appraisers appointed by the county
judge . ." in Sheer v. Kansas Neb. Nat. Gas Co. 43 The Court
has even ruled 44 that the Court is acting in the same ministerial
capacity when appointing the members of a court of condemnation
under the special procedure for the taking of property of a public
45
utility.
Even though the procedure appears to be clearly ministerial,
it still requires the exercise of judicial functions. 46 It is not the
author's intention to take the time necessary to elaborately distinguish these two positions; suffice it to say that it is possible
that while the proceedings are ministerial generally they do
possess certain judicial attributes.
1.

Powers of the County Judge

The condemnation proceedings are not proceedings instituted
before the county court nor are they conducted by the county
court, they are before the county judge. This rule was first
specifically mentioned in the Mattheis Case47 and, although re-

46

163 Neb. 1, 77 N.W.2d 773 (1956).
158 Neb. 668, 675, 64 N.W.2d 333, 337 (1954).
Application of the City of Sidney, 144 Neb. 6, 12 N.W.2d 104 (1943).
Neb. Rev. Stat., § 19-702 (Reissue 1954).
Albin v. Consolidated School Dist., 106 Neb. 719, 184 N.W. 141 (1921);

47

Webber v. City of Scottsbluff, 155 Neb. 48, 50 N.W.2d 533 (1951).
53 Neb. 681, 74 N.W. 39 (1898). There are two earlier decisions in

42
43

44

45

this same matter: 35 Neb. 48, 52 N.W. 698 (1892); 39 Neb. 98, 57 N.W.
987 (1894).
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iterated time and time again, the Court is frequently guilty of
loose language in referring to the county court when they mean
county judge. This is a frequent error of which the lawyer should
be aware, not being misled into making the same mistake.
The county court has been held not to have the power to
vacate an award of damages on the ground of fraud. 48 In order
to understand such a rule, it must first be determined whether
the use of the words "county court" were used loosely or as a
means of distinguishing between the court and the judge. A
reading of the case makes it clear that the words "county court"
were used intentionally and that there was no jurisdiction within
that court. The decision makes it clear that the court did not
determine the powers of the county judge to set aside the appraisal for any reason.
It has been held that the county court (loose language) has
power to correct any irregularities in the method of appraisement adopted by the appraisers. 49 It has also been held that by
failing to make timely objection to five appraisers, when the
statute provided for six, the plaintiff waived his right to an
appraisal by six.50 This appears pertinent for, at the time when
the objection would have had to be filed, it could only have
been filed with the county judge. It would seem then that
while the judge acts only in a ministerial capacity, supposed
only to appoint and swear in the appraisers, and then finally to
receive their report, he does have certain judicial functions which
must be exercised if the need arises. It would appear he can
correct clerical errors, vacate void proceedings, and he must have
power to fill vacancies among the appraisers, etc. In other words,
the county judge has some judicial power in condemnation proceedings, but these powers are limited to necessity and where
there is no other person or officer with authority to correct the
error.
One problem that is frequently vexatious at condemnations
is the power of the county judge to fill vacancies in the board of
appraisers. The problem, in spite of the frequency with which
it arises, is clearly answered by statute. Section 76-707 provides
that: "The county judge may fill any vacancies arising through
disqualification, inability to attend, or otherwise."
48

Ibid. •

O'Neill v. Learner, 93 Neb. 786, 142 N.W. 112 (1913), affirmed, 239
U.S. 24, 36 S.Ct. 54, 60 L.Ed. 249 (1915).
50 Johnson v. Platte Valley P. P. & I. Dist., 133 Neb. 97, 274 N.W. 386
(1937).
49
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2.

Pleadings

Except as to the requirements of the petition, there is little
case law in Nebraska upon other pleadings being used in the
original proceedings in condemnation. The author has always
doubted the authority of the county judge to accept other pleadings although, as a practical matter, is has been done in county
after county. The Mattheis Case5l gives the judge the right to
compel the amendment of the petition for the purpose of containing a more specific description of the property.
An early case 5 2 held that where there are several contiguous
lots owned by the same person, even though the petition filed
by the condemner described only certain lots, that the injury to
the entire property should be considered. This situation does
not create a necessity for the owner to file other pleadings, but
does necessitate the appraisers viewing the property and assessing the damage when notified by the owner of the situation.
3.

Appraisers

The actual ascertainment of damages is made by the appraisers. Their appointment, their duties, and their return are
therefore, the heart of the condemnation proceedings and some
five sections of the statutes deal with the requirements and duties. First, the county judge is to appoint three disinterested freeholders of the county, not interested in a like question, to serve as
appraisers. This is to be done within three days from the filing
of the petition and by order entered of record.5 3 The same section
further provides that the judge:
...shall direct the sheriff to summon the appraisers so selected
to convene at the office of the county judge at a time specified
in the summons for the purpose of qualifying as appraisers, and
thereafter proceed to appraise the property sought to be condemned and to ascertain and determine the damages sustained by
the condemnee.
The following section provides in part:
Upon convening of the appraisers, the county judge shall interrogate the appraisers as to their qualifications and may excuse
any appraiser
found by the county judge to be disqualified to
54
serve.

51 39 Neb. 98, 57 N.W. 987 (1894).
53

A. & N. R. Co. v. Boerner, 34 Neb. 240, 51 N.W. 842 (1892).
Neb. Rev. Stat., § 76-706 (Reissue 1958).

54

Neb. Rev. Stat., § 76-707 (Reissue 1958).
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The qualifications referred to are not, in the opinion of the
author, such matters as whether the prospective appraisers are
professional real estate brokers, contractors, farmers, etc., but
rather are they freeholders, disinterested in this or similar proceedings, and that they are residents of the county. It appears
that if they are freeholders, they may be presumed to be interested in lands, and our Court has been strict in seeing the statute
is followed by the appointment of the exact class and number
named by the statute to be appointed. While most of the opinions
are no longer directly in point because of statutory changes, the
tenor of the Court can easily be determined from this language:
"The words 'freeholder' and 'householder' . . . are not synonymous." 15 There are several other cases all to like effect, and also
holding that failure of statutory compliance in the appointment
of appraisers renders the proceedings void, not voidable. 56 A freeholder can be a purchaser of real estate under contract who has
not yet obtained his deed. The term freeholder not being given,
when used in this sense, the same technical strictness as in deeds.
The purpose of the statute is to prevent appraisements by those
not themselves interested in lands.5 7 Without giving the rather
complicated details, one case has upheld a slight variation from
the exact statutory language, but the variation was in doing a
little more than was required, rather than something less or different.Gs Also, see Shannon v. Bartholomew5 9 which discusses
the subject of necessity of five appraisers, but is not in point
under the uniform act or for highway purposes.
In Burkley v. City of Omaha,0 one of the
absent at the time set for hearing. The hearing
but the whole board joined in the final report.
that if it was an irregularity, it was only such as
died by the property owner taking an appeal.

appraisers was
was postponed,
The Court held
might be reme-

In State ex rel. Katelman v. O'Fink,61 the Court discussed a
point that arises frequently in condemnations. The Court found
55 Jones v. City of Aurora, 97 Neb. 825, 151 N.W. 958 (1915).
56 Nelson v. Harlan Co., 2 Neb. (Unof.) 537, 89 N.W. 458 (1902); Georgian
v. Department of Pub. Wks., 123 Neb. 648, 243 N.W. 886 (1932); Ira
v. Adamson, 125 Neb. 441, 250 N.W. 559 (1933).
Wheldon v. Cornett, 4 Neb. (Unof.) 421, 94 N.W. 626 (1903).
5s Burgess-Nash Bldg. Co. v. City of Omaha, 116 Neb. 862, 219 N.W.
394 (1928).
Z;983 Neb. 821, 120 N.W. 460 (1909).
G,0102 Neb. 308, 167 N.W. 72 (1918).
61 84 Neb. 185, 120 N.W. 938 (1909).
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that the appraisers had the duty to assess the damages to each
and all of those interested in the premises and to apportion the
value of the property appropriated among all those having an interest therein according to their respective interests. The finding
was based upon the then existing statute, which was different
from the present section, but the reasoning of the Court went
beyond the statute and would be applicable under our statutes.
The result, if law today, is that the appraisers should in their
return find the amount due for taxes and liens generally, including mortgages, rather than just the amount due to the titleholder.
Such a finding is not practical. It makes the board of appraisers
become more than finders of fact regarding damages; indeed they
must in some cases have knowledge sufficient to solve extremely
complicated legal problems. Also, if the reasoning prevails as to
lien holders, it also would be necessary, in the sake of consistency,
for the appraisers to determine heirship, settle disputed wills, etc.
It is submitted that it is better for the appraisers to find only the
amount due upon the land, separating a tenants interest, if not in
dispute, and then, if the various interests cannot agree among
themselves, to let them fight it out by appeal or other action in
the appropriate court.
The manner in which the appraisal is made is covered in one
short statutory section which should, according to the writer's
experience, be read by the county judge to the appraisers as soon
as they have taken the oath prescribed by statute. 2 The statute
specifies that:
It shall be the duty of the appraisers to carefully inspect and
view the property taken or sought to be taken, and also any
other property of the condemnee damaged thereby. The appraisers
shall hear any party interested therein in reference to the amount
of damages
when they are so inspecting and viewing the prop63
erty.

Five decisions of our Court shed light on this section; Four of
which have used substantially the same language in describing
the nature of this hearing. In the Higgens 4 and Jensen65 cases,
the rule was stated:
Condemnation proceedings commenced in a county court contemplate an informal hearing by the appraisers, a view of the lands,
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Neb. Rev. Stat., § 76-708 (Reissue 1958).

63
64

Neb. Rev. Stat., § 76-709 (Reissue 1958).
Higgens v. Loup R. P. P. Dist., 157 Neb. 652, 61 N.W.2d 213 (1953).

65

Jensen v. Omaha P. P. Dist., 159 Neb. 277, 66 W.W.2d 591 (1954).
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no record of testimony, and a report of damages assessed to be
filed subject only to the right of appeal.
The Scheer"6 and Heppe67 cases adopt the same language
except to add: "not to confirmation by the appointing court."
Not only is the statute clear, but so is the language of these late
decisions. Yet, at condemnation hearings in many counties of the
State, the procedure, instead of being an informal hearing, has
more attributes of a full fledged jury trial in the district court.
The fifth decision 8 previously mentioned applies to the procedure at the hearing a rule concerning the determination of
damages. It is well to consider this rule here since it is of extreme importance to the landowner. The rule is that the owner
of property taken or damaged is entitled to have all proper elements of damage considered by the appraisers, and, if they fail to
do so, he cannot afterwards maintain an action to recover damages omitted which were necessarily involved in the condemnation proceeding. This rule answers a question frequently asked
by the appraisers during their examination of the premises. Without proper knowledge of the law, they could conceivably omit
large items of damage in the belief that the owner would be compensated for those items in some other manner. Because even a
cursory examination of this facet of the appraisal process would
necessarily open up the subject of compensation or damages, it
is well to drop the matter except to mention that "proper elements of damage" do not include damage from faulty or anticipated faulty construction.
The final statutory provision dealing with the duties of the
appraisers reads:
After the inspection, view, and hearing provided for in section
76-709 have been completed, the appraisers shall assess the damages that the condemnee has sustained or will sustain by the appropriation of the property to the use of the condemner, and

make and file a report thereof in writing with the county judge.69
The few cases that apply to this section of the statute have
previously been cited under the discussion of the next previous
statutory section.

GOScheer v. Kansas-Neb. Nat. Gas Co., 158 Neb. 668, 675, 64 N.W.2d
333, 337 (1954).
07 Heppe v. State, 162 Neb. 403, 406, 76 N.W.2d 255, 257 (1956).
6s Gruntorad v. Hughes Bros., 161 Neb. 358, 73 N.W.2d 700 (1955).
69 Neb. Rev. Stat., § 76-710 (Reissue 1958).
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D.
1.

RESULTS OF APPRAISAL

Payment

The condemner shall not acquire an interest in or right to
possession of the property condemned until he has deposited
with the county judge for the use of the condemnee the amount
of the7 0condemnation award in effect at the time the deposit is
made.
These are the statutory terms concerning payment of the
award. There are few cases concerned with payment that are pertinent under the present statute. The case of Hoesly v. Department
of Roads & Irrigation7 is most helpful for it disposes of a problem created by the appraisers return in many highway eminent
domain cases. The appraisers often wish to, and do, make their
return in terms other than money. A frequent example is the
addition that the State shall construct a cattlepass, culvert, driveway, etc., as well as making the money allowance. In the Hoesly
Case, the question was whether the owner could be compelled
to accept other property in lieu of money. The Supreme Court
held that when the power of eminent domain is utilized, there
must be a standard medium of payment, binding on both parties,
and the law has fixed that standard as money.
While the statute does not specifically provide that the county
judge must hold the award until the time for appeal has expired,
or until the appeal proceeding has been finally disposed, any
reasonable consideration of the subject would lead to the conclusion that the judge must so hold a deposit, if made. In Peterson v. Department of Roads & Irrig.,72 a county judge turned over
the deposit to the landowner at the direction of an unauthorized
engineer of the State. But as the judge had written knowledge
of the intention of the State to appeal, the Court held that the
action of the judge did not deprive the State of its right to appeal.
2.

Abandonment

The present statute gives the condemner the right of abandonment, something it did not possess under many previous statutes.
The present statute states in part:
If no appeal is taken by the condemner from the award of
appraisers, the condemner will be deemed to have accepted the
70
71
72

Neb. Rev. Stat., § 76-711 (Reissue 1958).
143 Neb. 387, 9 N.W.2d 523 (1943).
137 Neb. 354, 289 N.W. 370 (1939).
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award unless he has within sixty days from the date of the award
filed an election in writing to abandon the proceeding. If the
proceeding is abandoned, proceedings may not again be instituted
by the condemner to condemn
the property within two years
73
from the date of abandonment.
There are no cases concerned with the portion of the statute
just quoted. There are, however, a few cases concerned with
abandonment, only one of which seems worth mentioning here.
It is the early case of Hull v. Chicago B. & Q. Ry. Co., 7 4 where it
was held that there was an abandonment when the railroad company withdrew the deposit of the award it had made, after taking possession of the property, claiming the proceedings illegal.
3.

Time of Taking

The time of taking is frequently confusing because of three
seemingly conflicting provisions; two being statutory and the
third being case law. One section provides that:
Upon deposit of the condemnation award with the county
judge, the condemner shall be entitled to a writ of
assistance to
place him in possession of the property condemned.7 5
On the other hand, another section provides in part:
The condemner shall not dispossess the condemnee until the
condemner is ready to devote the property to a public use, and
such title or interest as the condemner seeks to acquire shall not
be complete until the property is put to the public use for which
taken.7 6
The case law is this: "The time of taking is deemed to occur
77
when the petition for condemnation if filed."
The conflict is resolved in this manner. In the Armstrong
Case7 s the Court is referring to the time for determining market
value and damages in the district court, not the time when the
condemner is allowed to have actual possession. The two statutory provisions are not in conflict; they represent two separate
requirements, both of which must be fulfilled before the condemner

73 Neb. Rev. Stat., § 76-711 (Reissue 1958).
74 21 Neb. 371, 32 N.W. 162 (1887).
75 Neb. Rev. Stat., § 76-711 (Reissue 1958).
76 Neb. Rev. Stat., § 76-714 (Reissue 1958).
77 Platte Valley P. P. & I. Dist. v. Armstrong, 159 Neb. 609, 616, 68 N.W.2d
200, 206 (1955).
78 Ibid.
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shall have the right to possession.

That is, the amount of the

award must first be deposited with the county judge; second, the
condemner must be ready to put the property to public use.
4. Appeal and Effect Thereof
There are several sections of the uniform act that deal with
appeal. It is not necessary to quote them all. Most of the provisions are contained in four sections: 76-715; 76-716; 76-717; and
76-718. At this time we are not concerned with that part of the
appeal that pertains to the district court. Briefly the provisions
regarding the appeal, pertaining to the original proceedings, are
that either may appeal to the district court; the appeal is instituted by filing a notice of appeal within thirty days from the
date of filing of the appraisers report; that the party appealing
shall furnish surety; that the county judge shall within thirty
days prepare and file a transcript with the clerk of the district
court.
Most of the decisions on the subject of appeal more properly
belong under the heading "In District Court"3 9 A few will be
given here, however, as base points considered pertinent to the
proceeding before the appraisers and county judge. One of these
is that the landowner does not waive his objections to jurisdiction
by appealing from the award.80 It has also been held that, besides appeal, the decision of the county board in fixing assessments may be reviewed by the district court on a petition in
error.8 '
The decision of appraisers, where they have jurisdiction, is
conclusive unless reversed or modified by appeal.8 2 But in Horner
v. Eells8 3 where the appraisers failed to act and the county clerk
failed to give landowners notice of that fact, causing them to lose
their right to appeal, equity granted suitable relief. In State
v. Omaha & S. I. Ry. Co.,8 4 however, the failure to appeal defeated
the railway's defense to mandamus action to compel them to
construct a bridge.

79
80
81
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83
84

Infra, p. 460.
Platte Valley P. P. & L Dist. v. Feltz, 136 Neb. 227, 271 N.W. 787 (1939);
Albin v. Consolidated School Dist., 106 Neb. 719, 184 N.W. 141 (1921).
Dodge County v. Acorn, 72 Neb. 71, 100 N.W. 136 (1904).
Burkley v. City of Omaha, 102 Neb. 308, 167 N.W. 72 (1918).
114 Neb. 210, 206 N.W. 733 (1925).
103 Neb. 40, 170 N.W. 496 (1918).
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In Lowell v. Buffalo County,5 where there had been an award
of special damages caused by the vacating of a public highway,
an appeal to the district court was held authorized.
The filing of the appeal bond and the delivery of the transcript within the time limited has been held to be essential to
confer jurisdiction of the cause upon the district court in condemnation proceedings. 6 Where the State or its agency7is a party,
however, it is not necessary for the State to give bond.

E. REVERSE CONDEMNATION
It is provided in the uniform act that:
If any condemner shall have taken or damaged property for
public

use without

instituting

condemnation

proceedings,

the

condemnee, in addition to any other available remedy, may file
a petition with the county judge of the county where the property or some part thereof
is situated to have the damages ascer88
tained and determined.

This section was first enacted with the entire act in 1951.
From that time until late in 1958 there had not been any action
filed under the authority of the section. 89 Then in November
1958, two petitions were filed, appraisers appointed, and an award
made. From these, the landowner has appealed; one to the district court; in the other the condemner (not landowner) has filed
a petition in error. There is then no case law on the subject
except for those actions, of which there are many, that come under the words "other available remedy". These will be considered
along with appeals under the procedure in the district court.
V. IN DISTRICT COURT
To this point the amount
decision on eminent domain
of the points set forth in the
blank. For that reason, the

of material available from Nebraska
has been quite short, leaving many
general outline of the subject nearly
few cases that were available were

85 119 Neb. 776, 230 N.W. 842 (1930).

In re Petition of School Dist. of Omaha, 151 Neb. 304, 37 N.W.2d 209
(1949).
87 Peterson v. Department of Roads & Irrig., 137 Neb. 354, 289 N.W. 370
(1939).
88 Neb. Rev. Stat., § 76-705 (Reissue 1958).
89 After making considerable inquiry to no avail, this statement is true
to the best of the author's knowledge. Should the reader know of
such a filing, contact with the author giving name and parties would
be appreciated.
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set down; not in detail, but at least to the extent of summarizing
the point of law decided, even though in several instances they
were not quite to the point. Further, the lack of adequate coverage of the points of law made it necessary to abandon any outline of the subject except for the more major hearings. In dealing with district court procedure however, the material is much
more extensive, so the problem and treatment must be reversed.
Here, cases that do not make a point that appear pertinent to
present day statutes, procedure, or to highway acquisition will be
omitted entirely. Except in a few cases, those that are in point
will be mentioned only for the law; no attempt being made to
review any facts of the case unless necessary to understand the
legal principal involved.
A.

FORMALrrIEs OF APPEAL

The statutory provisions relating to an appeal to the district
court are contained in just three sections. Section 76-715 provides that:
Either condemner or condemnee may appeal from the assessment of damages by the appraisers to the district court of the
county where the petition to intitiate proceedings was filed. Such
appeal shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal within thirty
days from the date of filing of the report of appraisers as provided in section 76-710.
Section 76-716 provides that:
The party appealing shall also, at the time of filing of notice
of appeal, enter into an undertaking, with at least one good and
sufficient surety to be approved by the county judge conditioned
(1) that the appellant will prosecute such appeal to effect without unnecessary delays, and (2) that if judgment be rendered
against appellant, on the appeal, the appellant will satisfy whatever judgment may be rendered against him.
Section 76-717 further provides that:
Within thirty days after the filing of such notice of appeal,
the county judge shall prepare and transmit to the clerk of the
district court a duly certified transcript of all proceedings had
upon payment of the fees provided by law for preparation thereof.
The proceeding shall be docketed in the district court, showing
the party first appealing as the plaintiff and the other party as
the defendant. After docketing of the appeal, the issues shall be
made up and tried in the district court in the same manner as an
appeal from the county court to the district court in a civil action. 0"
Such appeal shall not delay the acquisition of the property and
placing of same to a public use if the condemner shall first deposit
with the county judge the amount assessed by the appraisers.
90

See Neb. Rev. Stat., §§ 24-544; 27-1301 to 27-1315 (Reissue 1956).
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There are then but four things to be done by the appealing
(1) file notice of appeal
party in order to perfect the appeal:
with the county judge; (2) file an undertaking with the county
judge; (3) have the judge prepare and transmit to the Clerk of
the district court a transcript of the proceedings; and (4) pay the
fees for the preparation of the transcript.
Only one decision touches upon the notice of appeal. In that
case although objection was made to the notice by the defendant
in error in the form of a special appearance, the attention of the
court was not directed to the special appearance and no order was
made thereon. 9 ' The record does show a consolidation of the two
appeals by consent of the parties, so the Supreme Court refused
to consider the point. The Court's written syllabus gives the impression that, where both parties appealed, a motion to dismiss
the plaintiff's appeal by defendant was not proper. Though based
upon lack of notice, this impression is not supported by the conclusions of the case itself.
Two decisions are concerned with the appeal bond. The latest
holds that the filing of the appeal bond is essential to confer jurisdiction of the cause upon the district court, 92 but the other 93 excludes the State or its agencies under authority of a special
statute.94
Early decisions were to the effect that the filing of the transcript within the statutory period was an essential act in perfecting an appeal. 95 This same view is also supported by a recent
holding.9 6 Unless sufficient cause is shown for the failure to file

the transcript within the proper time, and without laches on the
part of the appellant, the appeal will be dismissed.

A mere letter

to the county judge, without a demand for the transcript as a legal
right and without tender of fees for such transcript, is not suffi97

cient cause for failure to file transcript within the appeal period.
91
92

93

Republican V. R. R. v. Linn, 15 Neb. 234, 18 N.W. 35 (1883).
In re Petition of School Dist. of Omaha, 151 Neb. 304, 37 N.W.2d 209
(1949).
Peterson v. Department of Roads & Irrig., 137 Neb. 354, 289 N.W. 370
(1939).

Neb. Rev. Stat., § 24-334 (Reissue 1956).
95 Gifford v. Republican V. & K. R. R. Co., 20 Neb. 538, 31 N. W. 11 (1886);
Nebraska & C. R. R. Co. v. Storer, 22 Neb. 90, 34 N.W. 69 (1887).
96 Supra, note 92.
94

97 Supra, note 95.
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Yet, an early case9" tempers this rule to the extent that, if the
appellant uses diligence in the perfecting of his appeal, the law
will not permit him to be deprived of the appeal through the
neglect of the officer whose duty it was to prepare the transcript.
What is sufficient to constitute a transcript that will confer
jurisdiction on appeal is the subject of two conflicting views by
our Court. The first holds that a paper headed "Transcript", but
consisting only of a certified copy of the report of the commissioners, and containing only their assessment and award was sufficient to give the appellate court jurisdiction.9
This is not the
view taken by our Court, however, in the Peterson Case'10 where
the Court defines the transcript as being all papers relating to or
connected therein from the county judge.
B.

NATURE OF AcTION

There is no question concerning the jurisdiction of the district
court to hear an appeal in a condemnation proceeding. This jurisdiction is conferred both by the statutes heretofore quoted and
by a long line of condemnation cases so holding, both by direct
language and by implication from the very fact the matter was
being heard on the appeal. But the right to confer jurisdiction by
either consent, waiver, or estoppel was denied by our Supreme
Court in Lane v. Burt Co. Rural P. P. Dist.,10 ' except that the
Court stated that a party may be estopped to deny the existence
of facts upon which jurisdiction thereof depends. In Farmer's
Irrig.Dist. v. Calkins,10 2 a stipulation, in a situation where appeal
had been taken too late, which agreed to a new route across defendants land with damages to be ascertained in the district court
was held valid. Since the court had original jurisdiction of the
subject matter it retained the same despite the changes. It appears that once an appeal is perfected, the jurisdiction of the district court will extend to all proceedings remotely connected with
the subject matter of the original proceedings. This does not
mean, however, that the district court may hear on appeal any
form of proceeding, the jurisdiction being only the consent of the
parties.
98

Republican V. R. R. Co. v. McPherson, 12 Neb. 480, 11 N.W. 739 (1882).

99 Nebraska & C. R. R. Co. v. Storer, 22 Neb. 90, 34 N.W. 69 (1887).
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Peterson v. Department of Roads & Irrig., 137 Neb. 354, 289 N.W. 370
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163 Neb. 1, 77 N.W.2d 773 (1956).
102 104 Neb. 196, 176 N.W. 367 (1920).
101

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
The Nebraska cases leave no doubt as to the right to have the
original proceedings reviewed through error proceedings, it having been held in Dodge County v. Acorn' 0 3 that review could be
made by the district court on a petition in error as the county
board in fixing the assessments for the construction of a drainage
04
ditch had acted judicially. In Hoesly v. Dept. of Roads & Irrg.,
our Court held that review in the district court could be by either
appeal or by prosecuting error. This was a case to determine the
damages to be allowed for a taking of land for highway purposes
and was not an assessment of benefits, as in the Acorn case. 0 5
This clarifies the right to bring error proceedings in a normal
condemnation proceeding.
The right of the landowner to enjoin an unauthorized or improper taking of his property for a public use cannot be questioned. Nebraska alone has case after case upholding that right.
The most recent states the rule in this manner:
Injunction is a proper action in which to present the question

of unlawful or improper exercise of the power of eminent domain.106
This is a direct quote from a prior decision' 07 and is in line
with hosts of others, far too numerous to necessitate mentioning
each one.
The right to injunctive relief in condemnation applies to a
landowner whose land has actually been taken. The right does
not apply where there is damage only, it being the contention
that such an owner has adequate relief through remedies at law.
This was first held in Bronson v. Albion Telephone Co.,'10 although the Court indicated injunction would still lie upon proof
of insolvency or some other special circumstance. Other cases
holding injunction will not lie for damages only, as distinguished
from a taking, are McCook Irrig. & W. P. Co. v. Crews'0 9 and
O'Neill v. Learner. 0 This is true even though one of the most
72 Neb. 71, 100 N.W. 136 (1904).
104 142 Neb. 383, 6 N.W.2d 365 (1942).
lo5 Supra, note 103.
106 Heppe v. State, 162 Neb. 403, 76 N.W.2d 255 (1956).
107 Consumers P. P. Dist. v. Eldred, 146 Neb. 926, 22 N.W.2d 188 (1946).
108 67 Neb. 111, 93 N.W. 201 (1903).
109 70 Neb. 109, 96 N.W. 996 (1903); 70 Neb. 115, 102 N.W. 249 (1905).
110 93 Neb. 786, 142 N.W. 112 (1913); affirmed 239 U.S. 244, 36 S.Ct. 54,
60 L.Ed. 249 (1915).
103
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common causes of seeking an injunction is where payment has

not .been made at the time of the taking, in which case injunction
will lie."'

This right to injunctive relief, however, in line with normal
by a landowner guilty of

rules of equity, will not be granted

laches who idly stands by until after the work is well under way
or completed before taking action. 112 Also, it has been held that

while the owner undoubtedly has a remedy for negligent construction which caused him injury, he cannot maintain an injunc-

tion against a proper improvement made upon a public highway. 113 Where work is reasonably necessary upon a highway as
an item of proper maintenance, injunction will not lie to prevent
such work, it being presumed
that damages were satisfied when
4
the highway was opened."

Except as to the lack of need for a legal remedy being inadequate, the rules regarding whether an action in ejectment will lie,
where the question has been raised, seems to be settled upon the
same principles as if it were injunctive relief being requested.",;
The question of whether a landowner may seek injunctive or
other equitable relief as an issue of his appeal has never been
directly before our Supreme Court. It would appear that he
would have to make a choice of remedies; either to appeal in order
to question the properness of the proceeding and to seek to obtain a greater recovery for his damages, or to seek by separate
action, his injunctive relief. The case of Beckman v. Lincoln &
N. W. R. Co. is an indication. 1 6 An injunction was sought in a

111 Goergen v. Department of Pub. Wks., 123 Neb. 648, 243 N.W. 886

(1932); Sittler v. Supervisors of Custer Co., 91 Neb. 111, 135 N.W. 441
(1912); Johnson v. Peterson, 85 Neb. 83, 122 N.W. 683 (1909); Kime v.
Cass County, 71 Neb. 677, 99 N.W. 546 (1904); Hodges v. Board of

112
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Supervisors of Seward Co., 49 Neb. 666, 68 N.W. 1027 (1896).
Regonby v. Dawson Co. Irrig. Co., 126 Neb. 711, 254 N.W. 389 (1934);
Meyer v. City of Alma, 117 Neb. 511, 221 N.W. 438 (1928); Lucas v.
Ashland L. M. & P. Co., 92 Neb. 550, 138 N.W. 761 (1912); Clark v.
Cambridge & A. I. & I. Co., 45 Neb. 798, 64 N.W. 239 (1895).
Hitchcock v. Zink, 80 Neb. 29, 113 N.W. 795 (1907).

114 Churchill v. Beether, 48 Neb. 87, 66 N.W. 992 (1896).

115 Hall v. C. B. & Q. R. R. Co., 21 Neb. 371, 32 N.W. 162 (1887); Chicago,
B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Englehart, 57 Neb. 444, 77 N.W. 1092 (1899).

116 79 Neb. 89, 112 N.W. 348 (1907).
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collateral action and, in discussing the right of the owner to
bring such separate action, the court said:
An appeal to the district court does not vacate or supersede
the proceedings in the county court so as to prevent the railroad
company from proceeding with the construction of its road upon
the land, which may be completed and the road in operation
before the matter is finally heard in the district court. Any relief
that the7 district court might then afford cannot be said to be adequate."1
C.

EXTENT OF ACTION

1. IrregularitiesBelow
Where there are errors in the proceedings before the county
judge, which are not such as to defeat the proceedings, these may
be corrected in the district court. Where the plat in the project
plans and specifications was correct and the land was properly
surveyed, staked, and flagged on the ground, but an improper
description of the land being taken was made, the district court
was held to have power to correct the error." s Any issue to be
presented, other than the question of damages, including irregularities in the proceedings below must be presented by proper
pleadings." 9 Any irregularities in proceedings by the condemner
cannot be pleaded by it to defeat payment of damages for its
taking of condemnee's land for street purposes. 120 But it has also
been held that the error of a county judge in turning over the
amount of the award to the condemnee, upon the representation
of an unauthorized agent of the condemner, did not deprive the
condemner of its right of appeal.12 '
2.

Questions for Review

Except for the matter of damages, any other issues to be
raised must be pleaded.' 2 2 The failure of the condemner to attempt to agree with the owner prior to the institution of a pro-

1"7

Id. at p. 92.

118 McGree v. Stanton-Pilger Drainage Dist., 164 Neb. 552, 82 N.W.2d
798 (1957).
19 Trester v. M. P. R. Co., 33 Neb. 171, 49 N.W. 1110 (1891).
120 City of Omaha v. Clarke, 66 Neb. 33, 92 N.W. 146 (1902).
121 Peterson v. Dept. of Roads & Irrig., 137 Neb. 354, 289 N.W. 370 (1939).
122 Omaha Bridge & I. T. Co. v. Reed, 3 Neb. (Unof.) 793, 92 N.W. 1021
(1902).
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ceeding, may be raised as an issue on appeal. 1 23 Whether the
statute of limitations has run is subject to review by the district
court. 1 24 Other issues, except for the question of the necessity of
the necessity of the taking, have not as yet come before the
Nebraska Court.
The question as to the right to take being subject to review
by the district court, or for that matter, any court, can only be
touched upon here. To develop the subject at all would call for
an examination of the decisions of Federal and other state courts.
Our Court has in four different cases considered the question
and the general nature of the problem can be grasped by considering the decisions and rules of these four. First, in point of
time, was Welton v. Dickson,1 25 where the county commissioners
were opening a road. Suit to enjoin the opening was brought
challenging the constitutionality of the statute giving the power
to the commissioners. In its decision, the Court made this
statement:
When the public exigencies demand the exercise of the power
of taking private property for the public use is solely a question
for the legislature, 126
upon whose determination the courts cannot sit in judgment.
In the case of Howard v. Board of Supervisors of Clay County,
the landowner attempted an appeal to the district court to object
to the opening of a section-line road in addition to a request for
damages.127 The county attorney successfully moved to strike
the averments and the Supreme Court upheld the district court
for the reason that:
The propriety or necessity of opening and working sectionline roads is committed to the discretion of the county board,
and its decision is final . . . Whether a necessity existed or not
for the opening of the road in question was a governmental
question which did not concern plaintiffs, so long
as they received compensation for their damages sustained. 128
Higgins v. Loup River, 157 Neb. 652, 61 N.W.2d 213 (1953); Higgins v.
Loup River, 159 Neb. 549, 68 N.W.2d 170 (1955).
124 Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. O'Neill, 58 Neb. 239, 78 N.W. 521 (1899),
in which the Court held that owner before claiming damages could
wait within the period of limitation to determine the extent of injury
rather than being forced to commence immediately, and see: City of
Omaha v. Redick, 61 Neb. 163, 85 N.W. 46 (1901).
125 38 Neb. 767, 57 N.W. 559 (1894).
126 Id. at p. 780.
127 54 Neb. 443, 74 N.W. 953 (1898).
128 Id. at p. 446.
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The Court leaned heavily in its opinion upon the case of
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. State. 2 9 This was not a case involving the power of eminent domain, but its kindred right, also inherent in the state, the police power. In that case, the Court
concluded:
... that the courts will not interfere to prevent the enforcement of statutes on account of any mere difference of opinion
between them and the law-making branch of the government
130
respecting the wisdom or necessity of particular measures.
In May v. City of Kearney, the Court followed its previous
holdings and laid down this rule:
An owner must be given his day in court on the question of
just compensation by the statute authorizing the taking, but he
has no right to and the statute need not provide a day in court
on the question of the right of the State to take the property. 131
The same doctrine was upheld in Consumers P. P. Dist. v.
Eldred, the Court rephrasing what is much the same rule:
Generally the necessity or expediency of appropriating particular property for public use is not a matter for judicial cognizance, but is
for determination by the legislative branch of the
32
government.
Unanswered as yet is the point to which the Court will apply
this doctrine, undoubtedly there is a point of legislative discretion which can be beyond what the Court would call "reasonable",
but how to determine when that point is reached will be most
difficult. The best answer so far is found in this language of
our police power case:

133

It will not, of course, be contended that the power of the
legislature is, in that respect, absolute, or that it may at will
impose upon property burdens so unreasonable as to work a
practical confiscation. There is, as all admit, a limit beyond
which it cannot go and within which it will be confined by the
judicial power of the State.' 34
3.

Waiver by Appeal

In earlier days most of the condemnation proceedings involved the opening of section line roads by county commissioners.
129 47 Neb. 549, 66 N.W. 624 (1896).
130

131
132

Id. at p.573.
145 Neb. 475, 476, 17 N.W.2d 448 (1945).
146 Neb. 926, 931, 22 N.W.2d 188 (1946).

133 Supra, note 129.
'34

Supra, note 129 at p. 573.
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In those proceedings, where the owner filed his claim for damages with the county board, it was generally held, as in the
Trester case,135 and others, 136 that such a filing of a claim for
damages was a waiver of all objections to irregularities in the
proceedings before the county board. These decisions do not apply where proceedings are had to take land by condemnation proceedings as set forth in Article 7 of Chapter 76 of our statutes. It
is conceivable that one finding one of these early cases and not
understanding the distinction might have difficulty in realizing
the situation. At least two cases hold that in regular condemnation
proceedings the landowner did not waive his objections to jurisdiction by appealing from the award. 137
In line with points raised twice before, the case of Webber v.
City of Scottsbluff' 38 held that where the landowner appealed to
the district court from the award of the assessors (appraisers)
and raised only the question of damages, he entered his appearance and waived all objections as to notice. Other cases have
also held a waiver, not from the appeal itself, but rather from inconsistent acts or pleadings of the landowner, such as accepting
part payment of the damages' 39 or electing to ratify the award
40
though claiming the proceedings to be null and void.1
4. Parties
In its major aspect, the subject of parties does not belong
under the classification of "procedure in the district court," but
there have been a few cases wherein the parties were changed
or an attempt was made to change the parties, or, in some other
way, an issue different from that of the original proceedings was
raised. No attempt will be made to either discuss the issues or
to set forth any broad general principles, but the separate findings are presented for the reader. The points are raised in reverse
order to date of the decision.
135

Supra, note 119.

136

Davis v. Boone County, 28 Neb. 837, 45 N.W. 249 (1890).

137 Platte Valley P. P. & I. Dist. v. Feltz, 132 Neb. 227, 271 N.W. 787
(1937); Albin v. Consolidated School Dist., 106 Neb. 719, 184 N.W.
141 (1921).
138 155 Neb. 48, 50 N.W.2d 533 (1951).
139 Hoesly v. Department of Roads & Irrig., 142 Neb. 383, 6 N.W.2d 365
(1942).
140

Olander v. City of Omaha, 142 Neb. 340, 6 N.W.2d 62 (1942).
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In an action brought by both landowner and tenant for flood
damages caused by a diversion dam and for injunction, it was
held not to be error to permit the owner to enter a voluntary dismissal and let the tenant file an amended petition for the damages
141
to his leasehold which were also claimed in the original petition.
Where a mortgagee appealed without notice to or joining of
a mortgagor in appeal, it was held that the condemner might, if
necessary for the protection of its rights, make the mortgagor
a party to the appeal. 142
A railroad company, on an appeal of condemnation proceedings, is not entitled to have a third party substituted in its stead
on the ground that the third party has agreed to indemnify the
43
railroad for right of way costs.
5.

Issues and Pleadings

One of the first eminent domain cases in this state 4 4 held
that, upon appeal, no pleadings were necessary, but a few years
later the rule was changed to provide that no pleadings were
necessary where the only question was the amount of damages.
However, if other issues are involved, they must be pleaded to be
available. 145 Over the period of years, this rule has been affirmed,
reiterated and restated time and time again 146 until it is well entrenched in the minds of a considerable number of lawyers, particularly those whose experience with eminent domain cases is
based largely upon practice before the passage of the uniform
act in 1951. As a result of a reliance upon this well known rule,
several have overlooked the following statutory language:
After docketing of the appeal, the issues shall be made up
and tried in the district court in the same manner as an appeal
from the county court to the district court in a civil action,1 47
141
142
143
144
145
146

147

Thies v. Platte Valley P. P. & I. Dist., 137 Neb. 344, 289 N.W. 386 (1939).
Omaha Bridge & T. R. Co. v. Reed, 69 Neb. 514, 96 N.W. 276 (1903).
Omaha S. R. Co. v. Beeson, 36 Neb. 361, 54 N.W. 557 (1893).
Neb. R. R. Co. v. VanDeusen, 6 Neb. 160 (1877).
Republican V. R. R. Co. v. Hayes, 13 Neb. 489, 14 N.W. 521 (1882).
Lane v. Burt Co. R. P. P. Dist., 163 Neb. 1, 77 N.W.2d 773 (1956);
Platte Valley P. P. & I. Dist. v. Armstrong, 159 Neb. 609, 68 N.W.2d
200 (1955); Sheer v. Kansas-Neb. Nat. Gas Co., 158 Neb. 668, 64 N.W.2d
333 (1954); Webber v. City of Scottsbluff, 155 Neb. 48, 50 N.W.2d
533 (1951); Pierce v. Platte V. P. P. & I. Dist., 143 Neb. 898, 11 N.W.2d
813 (1943); U. S. Natl. Bank v. Loup River P. P. Dist., 139 Neb. 645,
298 N. W. 529 (1941); Fremont, E. & M. V. R. Co. v. Meahr, 28 Neb.
94, 44 N.W. 79 (1889).
Neb. Rev. Stat., § 76-717 (Reissue 1958).
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and these words from the procedure therein referred to:
In all cases of appeal from the county court or a justice of
the peace, the plaintiff in the court below shall, within fifty
days from and after the date of the rendition of the judgment
in the court below, file his petition as required in civil cases
in the district court, and the answer shall be filed 1 48and issue
joined as in cases commenced in such appellate court.

In the case of City of Seward v. Gruntorad,14 9 the appeal of
the landowner was dismissed by the district court for his failure
to file the petition on appeal within the fifty day period beginning
with the date of the filing of the notice of appeal in the county
court. This ruling was sustained on appeal to the Supreme Court.
The same situation and holding is found in the case of Jensen v.
Omaha P. P. Dist. 50 In both cases, there had been a showing of a
reason for not having made the filing within the due date, yet
in both cases the trial court ordered the cause dismissed. In both
cases the Supreme Court held the dismissal not to be an abuse of
discretion. Because the facts, as stated in these cases, indicate at
least on paper, a fairly reasonable excuse for the delay, the two
decisions have a tendency to indicate to a trial judge that any
reason for a delay must be actually bona fide and of a fairly high
order. Hence there have been a considerable number of dismissals by the district courts since the publication of these two
opinions.
The necessity of pleading now required by statute does not
change the old rule that if new issues other than the assessment
of damages are to be raised upon appeal, that they must be
pleaded.' 5' Further, if the condemnee fails to raise issues, he is
bound by the rule of res-judicata in a collateral attack.5 2 The
condemner, on the other hand, must plead special benefits in order
to claim them, 53 but if, upon the trial, they are considered as
being in issue the court may permit the filing of an amended
54
answer to include the special benefits.

148 Neb. Rev. Stat., § 27-1306 (Reissue 1956).
149

158 Neb. 143, 62 N.W.2d 537 (1954).

150 159 Neb. 277, 66 N.W.2d 591 (1954).

151 Platte Valley P. P. & I. Dist. v. Armstrong, 159 Neb. 609, 68 N.W.2d
200 (1955).
152
153
154

Scheer v. Kansas-Neb. Nat. Gas Co., 158 Neb. 668, 64 N.W.2d 333 (1954).
Supra, note 151.
Barr v. City of Omaha, 42 Neb. 341, 60 N.W. 591 (1894).
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The award allowable to the owner of property for damages
arising out of eminent domain, or taking for a public use, is based
on the constitutional provision 155 and not upon negligence, yet it
is quite common practice for negligence to be pleaded. Such a
pleading has no place in the petition. 15 6 However, if negligence
is pleaded and the petition also states a right of recovery under
Section 21, Article I, of the Constitution, the landowner is entitled
to recover notwithstanding the allegation of negligence, and this
is true whether or not the charge of negligence has failed of
proof. 157 A simple statement of this proposition is:
Where action is brought to recover damages under Section 21, of Article I, of the Constitution, it is immaterial whether
the petition states a cause of action 'ex delicta' or 'ex contractu'.158
D.

TRiAL

1. Generally
Generally, the trial procedure in condemnation proceedings
appealed to the district court is the same as in other civil actions.
The present statute states that the issues shall be ". . tried in the
district court in the same manner as an appeal from the county
court to the district court in a civil action." 159 Previously, the
statute, at least for the procedure relating to the esablishment,
vacation or alteration of a public road, had said that ". . . the
amount of damages the claimant is entitled to shall be ascertained
by said court [district] in the same manner as in actions by ordinary proceedings .
.. "60
This section was reviewed by our
Supreme Court in Lowell v. Buffalo County, an action for damages
resulting from the vacation of a public road. 16' However, it does
not appear in the opinion that the method of procedure was challenged by either party.
The general procedure of trial may be influenced by the holding that the right to take property in invitum must be clearly
15 Neb. Const., Art. I, § 3.
1513 Bonge v. Village of Winnetoon, 90 Neb. 260, 133 N.W. 203 (1911).
157 Snyder v. Platte Valley P. P. & I. Dist., 144 Neb. 308, 13 N.W.2d 160
(1944).
"58 Douglas County v. Taylor, 50 Neb. 535, 70 N.W. 27 (1897); Also, see:
Gledhill v. State, 123 Neb. 726, 243 N.W. 909 (1932).
150 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-717 (Reissue 1958).
100 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-141 (Reissue 1952).
161 119 Neb. 776, 230 N.W. 842 (1930); 123 Neb. 194, 242 N.W. 452 (1932).
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shown. A strict construction should be given statutes authorizing
such proceeding since they are in derogation of the common right.
This doctrine has become well established,' 62 a similar phrase
being used in a most recent decision. 16 3 While the doctrine applies to the authority to bring the proceedings, nevertheless it
may, by implication, be held to apply in case of doubt to questions
of procedure during trial, although at the present time this is pure
conjecture on the part of the author and not based upon either
statute or court opinion.
2.

Burden of Proceedingand of Proof

If there is one place in which there has been confusion in the
minds of both judges and lawyers regarding proper procedure in
the trial of a condemnation proceeding in the district court, it is
in regard to the burden of proceeding. Indeed, although the matter is well settled by several decisions, it is not uncommon for
counsel representing the condemnee to expect the condemner to
open the proceedings and accept the burden of proof regarding
damages. This confusion arises in those cases where the condemner has appealed, and results from the wording of the statute:
The proceeding shall be docketed in the district court, showing the party first appealing as the plaintiff and the other party
as the defendant.1 4
Hence, when the State or other condemning authority appeals,
it is docketed as the plaintiff.
Since the passage of the uniform act in 1951, at least three
decisions have definitely held that the burden of proof as to the
damages which the condemnee will suffer rests upon such condemnee. In over ninety percent of the cases tried, the matter of
damages is the only issue. So, for most purposes, these cases are
a complete answer to the problem. Two of these' 6 are cases
where the condemnee appealed; in the other the condemner appealed. 66 Yet, in all three cases, the court has placed the burden
on the landowner of showing the damages which he suffers while
Campbell v. Youngson, 80 Neb. 322, 114 N.W. 415 (1907), affirmed
82 Neb. 743, 118 N.W. 1053 (1908).
163 Heppe v.State, 162 Neb. 403, 76 N.W.2d 255 (1956).
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Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-717 (Reissue 1958).
Twenty Club v. State, 167 Neb. 37, 91 N.W.2d 64 (1958); Rath v.
Sanitary District No. One, 156 Neb. 444, 56 N.W.2d 741 (1953).
166 Platte Valley P. P. & I.Dist. v. Armstrong, 159 Neb. 609, 68 N.W.2d
200 (1955).
164
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the burden is on the condemner to show matters which tend to
reduce or mitigate damages.
Placing this burden on the shoulders of the landowner is not
a new doctrine in Nebraska, being originally established in several
167
of the first condemnation appeals to reach our highest court.
The railroad companies which brought these proceedings were
also the appellants. The Walker Case reasons for the rule in this
manner: The company may go upon the land provided the owner
is paid for the damages; The company admits taking the land,
but no specific amount of damages; In the absence of proof, the
landowner could not recover in any sum; Therefore the owner is
16
entitled to open and close. s
In the Umstead Case, an interesting supplement to the problem
is raised regarding the necessity of an appellant-condemner filing
an answer to the appellee-condemnee's petition. 69 The court held
it error to dismiss the appeal because appellant refused to answer,
the proper practice being for the owner to call his witnesses and
prove his damages the same as in any other case where a defendant
is in default. This point could not arise today under our present
statute, but, as there are, at the time of this writing, efforts being
made to amend the statute to provide that the condemnee shall
always be docketed as the plaintiff upon appeal, the question may
cease to be purely academic.
As heretofore noted under the discussion of conditions precedent, the condemner has the burden of proving that the statutory
requirements of a good faith offer and a reasonable effort to induce the owner to accept must be alleged, proved, and appear
on the face of the record. 170 While there is no Nebraska authority
upon the subject, it is general practice when the issue is not settled by the pleadings, pre-trial conference, or stipulation for the
condemner to meet this burden in his regular turn to present
evidence (after the landowner has rested). It is also the usual
practice for the court to submit the issue to the jury as a special
finding with the proviso that if the jury find the burden of meet0. & R. V. R. R. v. Walker, 17 Neb. 432, 23 N.W. 348 (1885); 0. N.
& B. H. R. R. v. Umstead, 17 Neb. 459, 23 N.W. 350 (1885); 0. N. &
B. H. R. R. v. Lamb, 17 Neb. 461, 23 N.W. 351 (1885).
168 0. & R. V. R. R. v. Walker, 17 Neb. 432, 23 N.W. 348 (1885).
109 0. N. & B. H. R. R. v. Umstead, 17 Neb. 459, 23 N.W. 350 (1885).
170 Higgins v. Loup River P. P. Dist., 157 Neb. 652, 61 N.W.2d 213 (1953);
Higgins v. Loup River P. P. Dist., 159 Neb. 549, 68 N.W.2d 170 (1955).
167
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ing the requirement not met they need make no finding in regard
to the amount of damages.
Where issue is joined concerning the need for the taking, it
has been held that the burden of showing a lack of need is upon
the condemnee. 171 This was the case where the owner claimed
construction was for a railroad other than the one bringing the
proceeding. 172 However, the situation was reversed where a county
claimed a waiver of damages on the part of the landowner, the
burden being
placed upon the county to prove the agreement con73
tended for.
Although these cases' 74 allow the condemnee to accept the
burden of proof and overcome a presumption of need to take by
the condemner, later decisions, such as May v. City of Kearney,17 5
which would deny the right of the court to hear or decide .the
issue, should not be overlooked. In Hillerege v. City of Scottsbluff, 7 6 a case involving the use of police power rather than
eminent domain, the litigant seeking to enjoin the city in the
exercise of the police power was held to have the burden of establishing, by clear and unequivocal proof, that the use of the power
was so unreasonable, arbitrary, or discriminatory that she was
deprived of property without due process of law. By analogy,
this view might easily be applied in eminent domain proceedings.
While not directly pertinent, the case is mentioned for its possibilities.
3.

Evidence

It is not the purpose of this article to consider the subject of
valuation, compensation, or the determination of the amount of
damages in eminent domain proceedings. It is obvious that the
subject of evidence in this type of action is overwhelmingly heavy
with rulings upon the method of determining "just compensation."
The treatment of evidence will therefore be more or less general
in nature with a few sketchy observations regarding particular
questions outside the realm of compensation or valuation.
171
172
373

174
175
176

Robert v. Sioux City & P. R. Co., 73 Neb. 8, 102 N.W. (1905); Deitrichs
v. L. & N. W. R. R. Co., 13 Neb. 361, 13 N.W. 624 (1882).
Beckman v. Lincoln & N. W. R. Co., 79 Neb. 89, 112 N.W. 348 (1907).
Chiles v. Custer County, 127 Neb. 481, 256 N.W. 45 (1934).
Supra, note 171.
145 Neb. 475, 17 N.W.2d 448 (1945).
164 Neb. 560, 83 N.W.2d 76 (1957).
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To be admissible in condemnation proceedings, the evidence
offered must sustain the allegations made in pleadings. Evidence
which is a complete departure from the theory set out in the
petition is inadmissible by the plaintiff. 17 7 In proceedings based
upon a taking under the power of eminent domain, it is not necessary to prove negligence or the commission of a wrongful act. 178
This point will not be questioned in a proceeding resulting from a
direct taking for highways. However, in actions begun by the
landowner for the recovery of damages based upon a temporary
taking, such as flood damage, there is a tendency to think that
the owner must prove that the damage occurred as the result of
some type of wrongdoing on the part of the governmental body
concerned. It is obvious upon reflection that not only is this not
required, but that it has no place in the proceedings, the basis of
the, lawsuit being the constitutional provision that a taking fo
a public use demands payment of just compensation. Such an
action is not based upon a damage resulting from the commission
of a wrongful act.
Our Supreme Court, in Sternberger v. Sanitary District,79
laid down another general rule which applies equally to other
types of cases besides eminent domain. The rule is that where
the witnesses in a condemnation proceeding give evidence with
perfect agreement, it should be carefully scrutinized by the court.
Another general rule specifically applied to this type of procedure
is to the effect that while it is not competent to show the price at
which other property has been sold for the purpose of proving the
value of the land taken, yet if, on cross-examination of witnesses
for the adverse party, the condemner adopts that line of inquiry,
error will not be presumed from a re-examination
confined to the
80
lines followed on cross-examination.
It has been held that it is proper to introduce a map or plat of
the land appropriated' 8 ' and that a photographic view is admis82
sible.1
177
178
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Casford v. City of McCook, 133 Neb. 191, 274 N.W. 464 (1937).
Wagner v. Loup River Public Power Dist., 150 Neb. 7, 33 N.W.2d 300
(1948); Quest v. East Omaha Drainage Dist., 155 Neb. 538, 52 N.W.2d
417 (1952).
100 Neb. 449, 160 N.W. 740 (1916).

180 Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Griffith, 44 Neb. 690, 62 N.W. 868 (1895).
181 Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Buel, 56 Neb. 205, 76 N.W. 571 (1898).
182 Omaha S. R. Co. v. Beeson, 36 Neb. 361, 54 N.W. 557 (1893), but this

early finding of the admissibility of photographs was hedged by being
made contingent to a situation where the jury was prevented from
viewing the premises.
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When an allegation is made of failure or inability to agree
with the owner as to purchase of the property, or the value thereof,
it is necessary for the condemner to prove such failure to agree. 3
Although it is indeed difficult to know just where the line is

crossed that carries us into a subject that is more "compensation"
than "procedure," a few of the rules concerning determination of
value are sufficiently general in nature that they may be stated
here. The few rules which will be set forth are those which apparently cause much confusion though they represent situations
which arise time and time again.
The first rule is that eveidence of the sales of similar lands
is proper to establish the value of the land being taken or the
damages to the remainder. Such lands, however, must be shown
to be similar in nature and situation to the property in question.
A sale of a filling station or other commercial enterprise not common to the particular location may bring much more than the
market or going value and will be grossly misleading.1 4 The
original rule, to the effect that the value of the property in question
cannot be shown by the price at which other property has been
sold,'8 5 was reversed in the Langdon Case. The original rule,
once so firmly established, 80 is apparently so well remembered
that it is difficult to forget. In any event, it sometimes comes as
a surprise to counsel that the sale price of similar lands7 may be
8
shown and that the new rule is now firmly established.
The fact that sale price of other lands of similar nature and
situation may be offered in evidence to establish the value of the
property in question does not mean, however, that the price paid
by the condemner for other property being taken by the condemner along with the property in question can be shown. These
prices cannot be introduced. This is and has been the rule.188
The principal, though not the only reason, for this distinction is
that the taking of the property is not sale upon the open market,
183

Higgins v. Loup River P. P. Dist., 157 Neb. 652, 61 N.W.2d 213 (1953).

Langdon v. Loup River P. P. Dist., 142 Neb. 859, 8 N.W.2d 201 (1943).
185 Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Griffith, 44 Neb. 690, 62 N.W. 868 (1895).
186 Rushart v. Dept. of Roads & Irrig., 142 Neb. 301, 5 N.W.2d 884 (1942);
Union P. R. Co. v. Stanwood, 71 Neb. 150, 91 N.W. 191 (1902).
187 City of Lincoln v. Marshall, 161 Neb. 680, 74 N.W.2d 470 (1956); Papke
v. City of Omaha, 152 Neb. 491, 41 N.W.2d 491 (1950).
188 Lynn v. City of Omaha, 153 Neb. 193, 42 N.W.2d 527 (1950); Papke v.
City of Omaha, 152 Neb. 491, 41 N.W.2d 751 (1950); State of Nebr. v.
Wright, 105 Neb. 617, 181 N.W. 539 (1921).
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being made under the threat of eminent domain. Such property
could have been sold at a low price, the owner not desiring the
difficulties, expenses, (or to some minds) embarrassment of a
lawsuit. On the other hand the condemner may have paid a
premium to avoid the expense of bringing condemnation.
Another citation regarding evidence should be quoted as it is
either so little known, misunderstood, or possibly willingly overlooked, that it is the cause for continual objection and legal skirmishing during trial. This is the rule of Crawford v. Central
Nebr. Pub. Powr. & Irrig.Dist.:
Everything which affects the market value is to be taken
into consideration . .. the burden of additional fencing, and like
matters, are to be included, not by being added together item by
a whole, they detract from
item, but to the extent that, taken 8as
the market value of the property.' 9
In spite of this holding, it is typical that such items as fencing,
and like matters, are, or are attempted to be, added together item
by item.
Before leaving the subject of evidence, one further rule should
be mentioned. It is universally known, understood, and as well
accepted as any rule regarding condemnation procedure, but it
is necessary to mention it for a better understanding of the discussion to follow regarding witnesses. In Langdon v. Loup River
P. P. Dist., the Court stated that ". . . in future condemnation
litigation, evidence of the award of appraisers shall not be admissible as evidence to go to a jury . . ." on appeal to the district
courts from such award. 90 Since the Langdon decision, other
cases have followed the holding,' 9 ' although prior to that time the
amount of the appraisal was usually given to the jury indirectly
1 92
and only for the purpose of allowing them to determine interest.
In the very early cases the amount of the award was submitted
directly to the jury. 193

189 154 Neb. 832, 836, 49 N.W.2d 682, 686 (1951).

190 Langdon v. Loup River P. P. Dist., 142 Neb. 859, 864, 8 N.W.2d 201,
205 (1943).
191 Twenty Club v. State, 167 Neb. 37, 91 N.W.2d 64 (1958).
192 Grimm v. Elkhorn Valley Drainage Dist., 98 Neb. 260, 152 N.W. 374
(1915).
193 Chicago, K. & N. R. R. v. Wiebe, 25 Neb. 542, 41 N.W. 297 (1889); Burlington & M. R. Co. v. White, 28 Neb. 166, 44 N.W. 95 (1889); Chicago,
R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Buel, 56 Neb. 205, 76 N.W. 571 (1898).
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4.

Witnesses

As previously stated, it is not the general purpose to discuss
the subject of valuation or compensation, but because the rules
do vary somewhat from those in other types of cases, the qulifications of the witnesses should be set forth here even though
nearly every decision in Nebraska relating to witnesses in eminent
domain proceedings deals solely with the valuation or amount of
damage to the property being condemned. One of the first eminent domain cases in Nebraska laid down a rule which remains
in substantially the same language in the most recent cases. In
Republican Valley R. R. v. Arnold, the Court stated that:
Where persons are shown to be familiar with the value of
a particular piece of land, across which a railroad has been
built, they may be permitted to testify as to the value of such
tract immediately before the 9location
of the road, and to the
value immediately thereafter. 4
The word used, it should be noted, is "persons"-not "experts."
Case after case follows this pattern, varying slightly for special
situations under the questions and objections raised in the separate
appeals. An owner was held qualified as to value where he had
resided upon and improved the land for several years and who
swore he knew the value; 195 a neighbor who testified he knew
the value of real estate in the vicinity was held prima facia competent; 196 persons familiar with value of a stone quarry were
allowed to testify as to its value; 197 residents of the immediate
neighborhood, some farmers, others retired farmers, were competent witnesses as to value of farm property without further
showing; 93 persons who resided for several years in the immediate
neighborhood of the land, and who appear, upon examination,
well informed of its situation, condition, and value, were competent. 199 Except to restate a fine summary of the rule as set out
in Langdon v. Loup River P. P. Dist., there is no need to cite such
cases further for there are many more; some quite recent. 20 0 In
13 Neb. 485, 14 N.W. 478 (1882). See also, Blakeley v. Chicago, K. &
N. R. R. Co., 25 Neb. 207, 40 N.W. 956 (1888).
'95 Sioux City & P. R. R. Co. v. Weimer, 16 Neb. 272, 20 N.W. 349 (1884);
B. & M. R. R. Co. v. Schulntz, 14 Neb. 421, 16 N.W. 439, (1883).
196 Northeastern Neb. R. R. Co. v. Frazier, 25 Neb. 53, 40 N.W. 609 (1888).
197 Burlington & M. R. Co. v. White, 28 Neb. 166, 44 N.W. 95 (1889).
198 Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Shafer, 49 Neb. 25, 68 N.W. 342 (1896).
199 Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Buel, 56 Neb. 205, 76 N.W. 571 (1898).
200 Wahlgren v. Loup River P. P. Dist., 139 Neb. 489, 297 N.W. 833 (1941);
Twenty Club v. State, 167 Neb. 37, 91 N.W.2d 64 (1958).
194
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the Langdon Case, speaking of the testimony of witnesses as to
the value of the land taken or the land remaining, immediately
before and after the taking, the Court said:
Either lay or expert witnesses may be used if proper foundation is laid showing they have an acquaintance with the property
of the market, the weight and
and are informed as to the state
20 1
credibility being for the jury.

Though an early case 20 2 held that in the absence of a showing
to the contrary there was no presumption that an owner was competent to testify regarding value, this decision has been revised
by four later cases. In Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Shafer,20 3 the
competency of an owner to testify was challenged. The Court
held that if neighbors in the vicinity of the property have been
declared competent, then an owner, who has resided upon his
own land and is acquainted from hearsay20 4 with the recent sale
of land in the vicinity and the price paid therefor, is also competent to testify. Practically the same rule was adopted in Chicago,
R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Buel,20 5 the decision being based largely upon
the holding in Burlington & M. R. R. Co. v. Schluntz.20° In Omaha
Loan & Trust Company v. Douglas County, the Court indicated
that an owner of land had a presumption in his favor concerning
the decision upon the rule of the Buel
his qualifications, basing
"and kindred cases. '20 7 As a result of these four decisions, it is
a general practice today never to question the owner's competency
as a witness. While, under the decisions, the witness must testify
that he is acquainted with land values in the vicinity, if such a
foundation is laid, it is usually for the purpose of securing a greater
degree of credibility. Note, however, that the old rule undoubtedly still applies to the non-owner.
The Omaha Loan Case also touched upon two other important
facets of competency. The Court sustained an objection that the
201 144 Neb. 325, 338, 13 N.W.2d 168, 175 (1944).
202 Missouri P. R. R. v. Coon, 15 Neb. 232, 18 N.W. 62 (1883).
203 49 Neb. 25, 68 N.W. 342 (1896).
204 The statement "from hearsay" appears in the syllabus by the Court,

but does not appear in the opinion. As the statement above is not a
quote from the syllabus, but paraphrasing, perhaps the words should
have been omitted as tending to give a false impression regarding use
of hearsay evidence in this type of situation.
205 56 Neb. 205, 76 N.W. 571 (1898).
200 14 Neb. 421, 16 N.W. 439 (1883).
207 62 Neb. 1, 86 N.W. 936 (1901).
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president of a corporation-owner had not shown himself qualified
when he attempted to testify as to value, holding that there is
no presumption of competency in favor of a corporation president
as in the case of an individual owning property.
The same case is also the first authority for the prevailing
general rule in condemnation cases that the competency of witnesses to testify as to their opinion is largely a matter of discretion
in the trial court and a ruling thereon will not be disturbed on
review unless clearly erroneous as a matter of law. This view
was sustained in a recent case 20 with the addition that should the
discretion be abused, it is ground for a new trial.
Even though a witness is qualified and testifies as to values
on direct examination, he may still be interrogated as to his
knowledge of land values in the vicinity on cross-examination.
This testing of his knowledge goes to the credibility of the witness,
20 9
uder proper Court instructions.
In cases where the land taken is being used for a particular
use, such as the producing of gravel, it has still been held that it
is not necessary that the witness be an expert in the subject of
gravel. Lay witnesses may still be able to give their opinion as
to value, if properly qualified as having an acquaintance with
the property and are informed as to the state of the market, the
weight and credibility of their testimony being for the jury.2 10
Perhaps most misunderstood of all condemnation procedure
is the right of an appraiser in the proceedings below to testify as
to values upon the trial of the appeal in the district court. It has
previously been noted that the amount of the award of the appraisers is not allowed to go to the jury (with exceptions, of course,
such as for impeachment of the witness). Frequently an appraiser
is challenged in hushed tones at the bench carefully out of hearing of the jury; sometimes just challenged. If and when he does
testify a foundation question directed as showing his knowledge
of the premises that indicates that he was a juror will bring forth
a storm of protest from the appellee's attorney. Yet there are
three cases holding that an appraiser may testify, with the qualification that the amount of the award is not to go to the jury.
The Langdon Case, first of the three cases, holds that an appraiser
208

Wahlgren v. Loup River P. P. Dist., 139 Neb. 489, 297 N.W. 833 (1941).

209 Lowell v. Buffalo County, 123 Neb. 194, 242 N.W. 452 (1932).
210

Medelman v. Stanton-Pilger Drainage Dist., 155 Neb. 518, 52 N.W.2d
328 (1952).
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is not disqualified from testifying on the values of the property. 211
The Twenty Club Case, a very recent decision, holds that appraisers
may testify as any other witness when proper foundation is laid. 212
The Pierce Case followed the rule of the Langdon Case, but here
the opinion shows that the witness was asked on direct examination
whether or not he had been one of the appraisers, the witness
answering that he had.2 13 In the Twenty Club Case, this same
fact is not mentioned in the opinion, but the bill of exceptions
shows that the witness was questioned at length about the appraisal; who was present, what was looked at; did the parties
explain their position, etc. As a result of these decisions, there
is no question that not only can an appraiser testify as to values
when a proper foundation is laid, but also that it may be shown
to the jury that he was an appraiser.
5.

Jury

The right in condemnation case§ to trial by jury is the acknowledged procedure in Nebraska. It was established in early cases
and also by general statute:
Issues of fact arising in actions for the recovery of money or

of specific real or personal property, shall be tried by a jury
unless a jury trial
is waived or a reference be ordered as hereinafter provided. 214
It is not a right resulting from the guarantees of the Nebraska
Constitution which provides that "the right of trial by jury shall
remain inviolate ... .,-215 This was so held in the case of City
of Mitchell v. Western Pub. Service Co., the Court finding that
when the Constitution was adopted, there existed no right of trial
by jury in cases involving the exercise of the right of eminent
domain. 21 6 Though the case involved the special procedure reserved for certain condemnations of utilities by cities with which
we are not concerned here, it does inform us of the fact that the
constitutional provision does not apply to eminent domain.

211 Langdon v. Loup River P. P. Dist., 142 Neb. 859, 8 N.W.2d 201 (1943).
212 Twenty Club v. State, 167 Neb. 37, 91 N.W.2d 64 (1958).
213 Pierce v. Platte Valley P. P. & I. Dist., 143 Neb. 898, 11 N.W.2d 813
(1943).
214 Neb. Rev. Stat., § 25-1104 (Reissue 1956).
215 Neb. Const., Art. I, § 6.
216 124 Neb. 248. 246 N.W. 484 (1933).
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Some of the early cases helped establish the right to jury
trial. Two such cases, both decided in 1888, held that:
The question of the value of real estate, or of damages sustained by a landowner from a right of way condemned across
his land, is peculiarly of a local nature, proper to be determined
by a jury of the county . . 217
In Welton v. Dickson, the rule is found in the syllabus of the
Court that:
Such constitutional provision forbids private property from
being compulsorily taken or damaged for any but public use,
and then only upon just compensation
218 being made, the amount
of which is to be assessed by a jury.
Despite this reference to the necessity of a jury in the syllabus,
a reading of the case fails to find a single reference to a jury, or
indeed, any need for such reference. Unfortunately, these are
the only cases the writer has been able to find that shed any light
upon this most important question.
As in other types of jury cases, the matter of the credibility
of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony is
for the determination of the jury.219 This includes the weight
to be given to expert testimony, though the jury is not bound by
the testimony of experts.220 In cases where a jury is waived, the
findings of the district court are equivalent to the verdict of a
221
jury.
It has also been held that the jury has a right to consider
of the competent evidence offered on the subject of damages
they have the province of harmonizing the testimony as far
possible, and, in case of conflict, to decide as to the weight to
222
given the testimony.
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Clarke v. Chicago, K. & N. R. R. Co., 23 Neb. 613, 616, 37 N.W. 484,
485 (1888); Omaha Belt Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 24 Neb. 707, 708, 40 N.W.
134, 135 (1888).
38 Neb. 767, 57 N.W. 559 (1894). "The property of no person shall be
taken or damaged for public use without just Compensation."
Newman v. Dept. of Public Works, 124 Neb. 684, 248 N.W. 94 (1933).
Medelman v. Stanton-Pilger Drainage Dist., 155 Neb. 518, 52 N.W.2d
328 (1952); Langdon v. Loup River P. P. Dist., 144 Neb. 325, 13 N.W.2d
168 (1944).
Missouri Valley Pipe Line Co. v. Neely, 124 Neb. 293, 246 N.W. 483
(1933).
Wahlgren v. Loup River P. P. Dist., 139 Neb. 489, 297 N.W. 833 (1941).
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Whether or not the jury should be permitted to view the
property is a question addressed to the sound discretion of the
Court,22 3 but where the jury does so view, it is evidence, and it is
error to instruct them that the purpose of the view is solely that
they might better understand the tesimony. 224 Yet, while the
view is evidence, 2 25 it is evidence only in connection with other
competent evidence.2 26 In the same connection, the language of
the Court used in sending the jury out to view the property has
been upheld where the Court directed the jury to look over the
22 7
premises, but not to discuss it among themselves.
6.

Instructions

Most opinions of our Court concerned specifically with instructions given to the jury by the district court naturally relate
to some phase of substantive law. A discussion of these instructions would best come under the title covered therein. There are
but a few cases which may be helpful in determining instructional
requirements in eminent domain cases.
The instructions in these few cases generally follow the same
rules existing for other types of civil cases; i.e., the well known
rule that:
The giving of short and definite instructions is meritorious,
but elaboration at some length on an instruction dealing with
the measure of damages in a condemnation proceeding, 228
in order
to clarify the subject for the jury, can be overlooked.
Isn't it a shame that so many judges remember only the last
part of the rule.
Several cases have held that if there is no issue raised in the
pleadings, or no evidence on a particular phase of the case, to
give an instruction on that phase is error; i.e., where an instruction
was requested for the offsetting of the damage by special benefits
223

224
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Langdon v. Loup River P. P. Dist., 144 Neb. 325, 13 N.W.2d 168 (1944);

Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Farwell, 59 Neb. 544, 81 N.W. 440 (1900).
Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Farwell, 59 Neb. 544, 81 N.W. 440 (1900).
Supra, note 223.
Platte Valley P. P. & I. Dist. v. Armstrong, 159 Neb. 609, 68 N.W.2d
200 (1955); Stull v. Dept. of Roads and Irrig., 129 Neb. 822, 263, N.W.
148 (1935); Drollinger v. Hastings & N. W. R. Co., 98 Neb. 520, 153 N.W.
619 (1915); Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Farwell, 60 Neb. 322, 83 N.W.
71 (1900).
Drollinger v. Hastings & N. W. R.Co., 98 Neb. 520, 153 N. W. 619 (1915).
Pearse v. Loup River P. P. Dist., 137 Neb. 611, 290 N.W. 474 (1940).
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where special benefits were not pleaded and the only evidence
was a change in the facts given by a witness between his direct
and cross-examination. 229 This same holding was made in Backer
v. City of Sidney,2 30 the Court finding no evidence of special benefits. Therefore the submission of the issue to the jury constituted
prejudicial error. On rehearing, the Backer Case23 1 had one of
the syllabus points withdrawn on the matter of special benefits,
but this did not change the matter as stated above. However, it
did give rise to a further elaboration of the rule, limiting the issue
in the instructions to the same scope that the issue is limited by
the evidence.
It has also been held that where the evidence does not disclose
that there were minerals in or under the land involved, it is prejudicial error to instruct the jury to deduct mineral value, if any,
from the market value of land.2 32 In the same proceeding it was
held that, where there could legally be a reverter but no showing
in the evidence of any such possibility, it was error to instruct
on the matter.
In line with our previous discussion of the view of the premises
by the jury, it is interesting to note that in Stull v. Dept. of Roads
& Irrigation233 it was held that an instruction relating to an offset for special benefits was not warranted where the jury had
viewed the premises but had heard no other evidence as to special
benefits. An early decision 234 held that where the Court instructed the jury that the landowner should have an allowance
for "any incidental damages" sustained by reason of the location
of the road, it was liable to mislead the jury if the Court did not
also state what constitutes incidental damages.
In Application of Burt County Public Power Dist.,235 the
Supreme Court held the trial court erred in failing to instruct
the jury that interest should not be included in the verdict, but,
under the circumstances of the case, the error was not prejudicial.
As this situation applies in all condemnation cases, it should be

229

Omaha Loan & Trust Co. v. Douglas Co.,, 62 Neb. 1, 86 N.W. 936 (1901).

230

165 Neb. 816, 87 N.W.2d 610 (1958).

Neb.
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State v. Cheyenne County, 157 Neb. 533, 60 N.W.2d 593 (1953).

492, 89 N.W.2d 592 (1958).

233

129 Neb. 822, 263 N.W. 148 (1935).

234'

Otoe County v. Heye, 19 Neb. 289, 71 N.W. 145 (1886).
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163 Neb. 1, 77 N.W.2d 773 (1956).
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remembered that the jury should not be left to chance to debate
between themselves whether or not to add interest and if so, at
what per cent.
VI.

AWARD, DISMISSAL, AND JUDGMENT.

A. AWARD
It is the general rule that the award of the appraisers is conclusive against the parties to the action upon all issues raised in
the proceedings. This has been the holding of a number of cases,
but with slightly varying emphasis on one phase or another of
the general statement. 236 In Snyder v. Platte Valley P. P. & I.
Dist., a leading case on this matter, our Court stated the rule in
this manner:
It is well settled by the decisions of this court that the

final award in a condemnation proceeding for the acquisition of
a right of way is conclusive upon the parties thereto as to all
matters necessarily within the issues joined, although not formally litigated. 2 37

This case also quotes with approval a statement made in Atchison & N. R. Co. v. Boerner which is an enlargement and, to some
extent, a clarification of the rule just quoted:
In such case the damages are to be appraised by commissioners appointed by the county judge for that purpose, and if
either party is dissatisfied with the award, an appeal may be
taken to the district court. Boerner was entitled to have all
proper elements of damage considered by the commissioners, and,
if they failed to do so, he cannot afterwards maintain an action
to recover damages thus omitted, which were necessarily involved
in the issues in the condemnation proceedings, and which he was
bound to present for their consideration therein.238
239
The Court then cited five other cases holding likewise.

236

As the rule applies equally to the award of appraisers and to a jury

verdict, no attempt will be made here to distinguish them in citing
either rules or cases.
140 Neb. 896, 901, 2 N.W.2d 327, 329 (1947).
238 34 Neb. 240, 247, 51 N.W. 842, 843 (1892).
239 Omaha & R. V. R. Co. v. Maschel, 38 Neb. 281, 56 N.W. 875 (1893);
237

Omaha S. R. Co. v. Todd, 39 Neb. 818, 58 N.W. 289 (1894); Fremont,

E. & M. V. R. Co. v. Bates, 40 Neb. 381, 58 N.W. 959 (1894); Chicago,
B. & Q. R. Co. v. O'Connor, 42 Neb. 90, 60 N.W. 326 (1894); Psota v.
Sherman County, 124 Neb. 154, 245 N.W. 405 (1932).
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Since the Snyder decision, at least three later opinions have
facets of our original statement. This time the Court credits the
rule to Churchill v. Beethe:
It is now the settled law of the state that for all injuries
which may arise on account of the proper construction of future
operation of an improvement, an adjoining proprietor 240
must be
compensated in the original condemnation proceedings.
Since the Snyder decision, at least three later opinions have
upheld one or more of the quotations supplied here and the gen24 1
eral tenor of the entire subject.
242
It is brought out in Bunting v. Oak Creek Drainage District
that the petition in condemnation must show the desired use and
the necessity for the improvement to bar a future claim for damages. It is quite obvious, upon a little thought, that if the intended
use is not stated in the application, the appraisers could not possibly make full allowance for all such damages.

It is also well settled that a landowner who fails to appeal
from the appraisers award is conclusively bound by it. 243 However, the award is binding only for those damages which may reasonably be anticipated upon the assumption that the work will be
built and operated with due care and skill, and with no unnecessary
injury to property outside of the right of way.2 44 Damages are
recoverable for maintaining an insufficient culvert or drain resulting in flooding of lands, the owner being entitled to damages
as though the road was to be constructed. Damages are estimated
on the theory that construction and maintenance will be reasonably proper and done in a skillful manner. 245 Similar findings
have been made where flooding resulted from improper construction of a drainage ditch and bridge over the same,2 46 and where
240
241

242
243

Churchill v. Beethe, 48 Neb. 87, 90, 66 N.W. 992, 993 (1896).
Burnett v. Central Neb. P. P. & I. Dist., 147 Neb. 458, 23 N.W.2d 661
(1946); Gruntorad v. Hughes Bros., 161 Neb. 358, 73 N.W.2d 700 (1955);
McGree v. Stanton-Pilger Drainage Dist., 164 Neb. 552, 82 N.W.2d 798
(1957).
99 Neb. 843, 157 N.W. 1028 (1916).
Gruntorad v. Hughes Bros., 161 Neb. 358, 73 N.W.2d 700 (1955); Ehlers
v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 118 Neb. 477, 225 N.W. 468 (1929); Omaha
B. & T. R. Co. v. Reed, 69 Neb. 514, 96 N.W. 276 (1903), affirming
3 Neb. (Unof.) 793, 92 N.W. 1021 (1902).
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Burlington & M. R. R. Co. v. Schluntz, 14 Neb. 421, 16 N.W. 439 (1883).
Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Andreesen, 62 Neb. 456, 87 N.W. 167 (1901).
Bunting v. Oak Creek Drainage Dist., 99 Neb. 843, 157 N.W. 1028 (1916).
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action of a river, after a pilot channel had been first dug, resulted
in the taking of additional land over that contemplated at the
time of the condemnation. 2 47 It was also held in an early opinion
that damages for possession caused by a wrongful entry upon the
land before condemnation may be allowed separate from the bringthe allowance of damages
ing of condemnation proceedings and that
248
is not a right of the trespasser to entry.
One who has an interest in the land condemned, such as a
mortgagee, but who does not receive notice of the condemnation
is not barred by the proceedings. Such a mortgagee may maintain
a subsequent foreclosure suit. 249 But a city, having a lien for
special assessments, which does not establish this fact before the
has expired, offset its
appraisal cannot, after the time for appeal
2 50
lien against the damages for the taking.
It is, also established that where the award for damages has
not been established with the county judge, the owner may enjoin
the condemner from occupying the land, or sue in trespass, even
where the condemner has appealed to the district court.25 1 The
owner may also bring suit against the condemner for the amount
of the award within five yeais from the making and confirmation
of the award.2 52 The same case also holds that, after taking possession of the premises, the city cannot allege its own irregularities
in procedure as a reason for avoiding payment of the amount of
the award to the owner.
Other findings regarding the conclusiveness of the award
which may be of interest are to the effect that where a county
board, ten years after award, presents the amount of the award
into court with interest, and the owner accepts the money, the
county may then proceed to open the road and the owner is estopped
from making any further claim. 25 3 Also, a landowner cannot accept the portion of the award which is in his favor and thereafter prosecute appeal or error from the part that is against him.2 54
McGree v. Stanton-Pilger Drainage Dist., 164 Neb. 552, 82 N.W.2d 798
(1957).
248 Republican Valley R. Co. v. Fink, 18 Neb. 82, 24 N.W. 439 (1885).
249 Dodge v. Omaha & S. W. R. Co., 20 Neb. 276, 29 N.W. 936 (1886).
250 State v. O'Fink, 84 Neb. 185, 120 N.W. 938 (1909).
25G1Ray v. Atchison & Neb. R. R. Co., 4 Neb. 439 (1876). See also, Republican Valley R. Co. v. Fink, 18 Neb. 82, 24 N.W. 439 (1885).
252 City of Omaha v. Clarke, 66 Neb. 33, 92 N.W. 146 (1902).
253 Clay County v. Howard, 95 Neb. 389, 145 N.W. 982 (1914).
254 Hoesly v. Dept. of Roads & Irrig., 142 Neb. 383, 6 N.W.2d 365 (1942).
247
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B.. DISMISSAL
In condemnation proceedings, if the condemner desires not
to prosecute an appeal to the district court, instead of moving to
dismiss, the condemner should file a motion to affirm the award.
This was first set out in Berggren v. Fremont, E. & M. V. R. R. Co.
where the company's motion to dismiss was sustained. 2 5
On
appeal, the Supreme Court held that a motion to affirm was proper
as the owner, having been deprived of the money, was entitled
to interest and the affirmation would carry both interest and
costs which a dismissal would not do. This holding has been followed by two later cases, the latest of which holds that, in the
absence of fraud or undue advantage, a motion to affirm the award
by the appellant in district court is a matter of right in the ab256
sence of a cross-appeal.
In one proceeding, an appealing party on a judgment of a
justice of the peace to the district court was challenged upon the
ground that the proper motion was for affirmance rather than
dismissal, citing the two condemnation cases then existing on
this point. The Court quickly distinguished and explained the
distinctions between an appeal from a judgment and from an ap2 57
praiser's award.
C.

JUDGMENT

While the matter was discussed at some length under "Award"
because of its application to the jury, it might be well to restate
the rule regarding the conclusiveness of a judgment in eminent
domain proceedings. The owner of property taken or damaged
is entitled to have all proper elements of damage considered by
the jury, and he cannot afterwards maintain an action to recover
for damages omitted which were necessarily involved in the con258
demnation proceedings.
Two early decisions held that, when a jury verdict was received, it was the duty of the district court to enter judgment
255 23 Neb.
256

257
258

620, 37 N.W. 470 (1888).

Robbins v. Omaha & N. P. R. R. Co., 27 Neb. 73, 42 N.W. 905 (1889);
U. S. Nat'l. Bank v. Loup River P. P. Dist., 139 Neb. 645, 298 N.W. 529
(1941).
Eden Musee Co. v. Yohe, 37 Neb. 452, 55 N.W. 866 (1893).
McGree v. Stanton-Pilger Drainage Dist., 164 Neb. 552, 82 N.W.2d
798 (1957). See also, Sheer v. Kansas-Neb. Natural Gas Co., 158 Neb.
668, 64 N.W.2d 333 (1954).
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thereon, and to give the condemning party an election would
leave the landowner in a state of uncertainty.2 59 The Drath Case
held that execution may be issued on the judgment and that there
may be no abandonment of the judgment by the condemning party
to avoid payment.
In Sternberger v. Sanitary Dist., at the time the proceedings
were instituted, one Sternberger was the owner.2 60 He sold and
one Corbin became the owner. On appeal, the District complained
that appellee was not the real party in interest. The Court dismissed the contention stating that the proceeding may be in the
name of the person, as plaintiff, who owned the land condemned
at the time the proceedings were commenced. In such case the
Court should order the payment of the judgment to the party
entitled to the damages.
A most interesting point concerning the right to amend or
correct the verdict of the jury was raised in Swygert v. Platte
Valley P. P. & I. Dist.261 The verdict was in an amount whereby
the inclusion of the interest in the verdict caused the verdict to
exceed the award; without the interest, the verdict was not greater
than the award. Under the circumstances of the trial and instructions, it was apparent that this was so; therefore, the verdict not
being greater than the award upon appeal by the landowner, interest was not allowable. The owner contended in the Supreme
Court that a correction could not be made by reversal with directions to the trial court to enter a proper judgment; instead there
must be a new trial if there is a reversal for any reason. The Court
said that the old common-law rigors have been ameliorated by
the Code of Civil Procedure and that the rule is:
As a general rule the court cannot make an amendment or
correction as to a matter of substance after the verdict has been
recorded and the jury discharged; but the discharge of the jury
does not deprive the court of its power to amend or correct with
respect to clerical errors or formal matters, and this may be
exercised even at a term subsequent to that in which the verdict
was rendered. 262

Dietrichs v. Lincoln & N. W. R. R. Co., 12 Neb. 225, 10 N.W. 718 (1881);
Drath v. B. & M. R. R. Co., 15 Neb. 367, 18 N.W. 717 (1884).
260 100 Neb. 449, 160 N.W. 740 (1916).
259

261 133 Neb. 194, 274 N.W. 492 (1937).
202 Ibid., at pp. 196 and 494.
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VII. 4 APPEAL.
The rules of appeal in eminent domain cases do not vary
from the rules of appeal in other types of civil cases except as
all cases vary in procedure to the limited degree required by
different sets of facts. In condemnation opinions, the general
rule of all jury cases is repeated time and again with only slight
variance of wording; i.e., damages sustained by a landowner for
right of way condemned is a question to be determined by a
jury, and this Court will not ordinarily disturb the verdict if it
263
is based upon the evidence in the case.

This reluctance to set aside a jury verdict, except when
clearly wrong, has often been stated by the Court. This reluctance is even stronger when the jury has been permitted to view
264
the premises.
A verdict will not ordinarily be set aside because the jury
based their verdict upon the testimony of witnesses whose estimates were highest,26 5 nor because the jury based its verdict
upon the testimony of witnesses whose estimates were the lowest.26 6 In the White Case, the Court noted that, in cases that had
come before the Court, there had been a tendency upon the part
of juries to accept the medium or lower estimates of witnesses
more frequently than the higher.2 67 Although reversals have
been secured when the Court has felt that the verdict was generally excessive, if there is evidence to support the verdict, it
will not be set aside as being the result of passion, prejudice, or
undue means. 268 However, a remittitur can be ordered when a
263
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Northeastern Neb. R. R. Co. v. Frazier & Frazier, 25 Neb. 42, 40 N.W.
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clear preponderance of the evidente shows the evidence to be
excessive. 269 It has also been said that:
When a verdict is so large as to raise a presumption that it
was based on prejudice rather than on sober judgment on the
270
evidence submitted, it will be set aside and a new trial ordered.
Where the cause is tried to the court without a jury, there
is a presumption that incompetent testimony is disregarded where
properly admitted evidence is sufficient to sustain the decision.
An aggrieved party is not entitled to a trial de novo on appeal
because a jury was waived at trial.271 With a jury waived, it
has been held that the judgment will be affirmed if there is sufficient competent evidence to sustain the recovery, 272 and that
the finding has the force of a verdict and will not be disturbed
upon appeal unless clearly wrong. 273 It has also been held that
in error proceedings, the findings of the appraisers will be 2 given
74
the same weight and conclusiveness as a verdict of a jury.
Where the trial court instructs upon a wrong measure of
damages, but the case is tried on a theory consistent with instruction given, the theory will be adhered to on appeal whether it is
correct or not. 275 Similarly, it has been held that where no objection is made in the court below to certain evidence of damages,
which under the prevailing rules is inadmissible, the objection
is not available on appeal in the Supreme Court.276 Nor can the
proper method of damages be raised for the first time in the
Supreme Court.277 Where the review by the Supreme Court is
upon error proceedings, only those objections will be considered
which were made before the county commissioners at
the time
278
the objections were filed with them by the landowner.
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187, 292 N.W. 461 (1940).
Mo. Valley Pipe Line Co. v. Neely, 124 Neb. 293, 246 N.W. 483 (1933).
City of South Omaha v. Omaha, B. & I. R. Co., 90 Neb. 527, 134 N.W.
172 (1912).
Quivey v. City of Mitchell, 133 Neb. 727, 277 N.W. 50 (1938).
Hoesley v. Dept. of Roads & Irrig., 143 Neb. 387, 9 N.W.2d 523 (1943).
Behle v. Loup River P. P. Dist., 138 Neb. 566, 293 N.W. 413 (1940).
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Davis v. Boone County, 28 Neb. 837, 45 N.W. 249 (1890); and see Blue
River Power Co. v. Hronik, 112 Neb. 500, 199 N.W. 788 (1924).

EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEDURE
VIII. CONCLUSION.
With well over four hundred cases arising out of or concerned
in some manner with the power of eminent domain in Nebraska,
it has been the author's view that a fairly complete resum=6 of
procedure may be had by reviewing the established Nebraska law
upon the subject. However, so many gaps appear that it has not
always been possible to do more than present the merest suggestion of proper procedure. The final result is a collection and
grouping of Nebraska cases in a manner which, it is hoped, is
more workable than the system followed by the digests. If this
is the case, then the purpose of the author has been fulfilled.

J!
'I

Conventional Diamond Interchange

Interstate Right-of-Way; 40 Acres of Land Per Mile

